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We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document
historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent
of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between
political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites.
We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering
Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal:
a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty.
Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's
political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets
power.
Ernesto Dal Bó
Haas School of Business
University of California, Berkeley












Northwestern University School of Law
357 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611-3069
j-snyder@law.northwestern.edu1 Introduction
A recent article in The Economist complained that the last two US presidential elections have
been dominated by descendants of former presidents or senators. President Bush is the son
of a president and grandson of a senator, Mr. Gore is the son of a senator and the exception
is John Kerry, who, according to the article, is ￿thanks to a rich wife, the richest senator
in a Senate full of plutocrats.￿ 1 Political dynasties are present in other democracies as well,
such as India, where the Gandhi dynasty has spanned three generations and produced four
national leaders. The main concern with political dynasties as voiced in the popular press
is that they are somehow un-democratic.2 Theorists of elites have had similar concerns.
Michels (1999 [1911]), writing on ￿the iron law of oligarchy,￿stated that even in democratic
organizations the leadership, once elected, would entrench itself in power, undermining the
democratic principle of a level playing ￿eld. Writers like Pareto and Mosca saw a complex
set of forces behind the persistence of elites. Mosca (1966 [1896], p.74) argued that ￿every
class displays the tendency to become hereditary, in fact if not in law (our translation).￿Ac-
cording to Mosca, even when political positions are open to all, a family tie to those already
in power would confer various advantages. All three main theorists of elites, Mosca, Pareto,
and Michels, thought that political elites are largely self-perpetuating (Putnam 1976, p.4).
But the observation of persistent political elites does not necessarily indicate that any kind of
self-perpetuation has taken place. Mosca himself considered (skeptically) the di⁄erent argu-
ment that persistent inequalities in political attainment could re￿ ect hereditary inequalities
1See The Economist article ￿Meritocracy in America: Ever higher society, ever harder to ascend,￿De-
cember 29th 2004.
2One concern regarding political dynasties is that inequality in the distribution of political power may
re￿ ect imperfections in democratic representation. Conventional wisdom considers that access to resources,
key people, or name recognition￿ rather than merit￿ boost the chances of a particular person to attain political
power. Media articles have reported on why members of the National Congress party thought Sonia Gandhi
was a good candidate: ￿The Congress Party thinks the Gandhi name is a vote winner.￿ (￿Rallying the
masses,￿Time South Paci￿c 09/13/99). In a similar vein, The Economist noted that ￿The party has better
politicians than she but none with her star quality (more an emanation of her pedigree than her personality).￿
(￿Sonia, of course￿ ; 11/18/2000)
2in talent and drive. If traits such as talent run in families, this may yield persistent ad-
vantages to some families over others that are not due to their already occupying positions
of authority. The question then arises: does the existence of political dynasties reveal that
self-perpetuation operates in democratic politics (and therefore the classic theorists were
right), or does it just re￿ ect original di⁄erences in ability across families?
The main contribution of this paper is to show the existence of self-perpetuation, using
the particular case of the Congress of the United States. We de￿ne self-perpetuation as a
power-treatment e⁄ect, whereby holding political power for longer increases the probability
that one￿ s heirs attain political power in the future regardless of family characteristics. We
start by showing that there is a signi￿cant correlation between the tenure length of a legislator
and the probability of her relatives attaining congressional o¢ ce in the future. However, this
association could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity across families. Original dynasty
traits (old money, genetic endowments, etc.) may explain both why a person had a long
career and why her relatives gained legislative seats later on.
In order to prove that self-perpetuation is present, we need to establish a causal relation-
ship between length in o¢ ce and posterior dynastic success. For this we use two instrumental
variables approaches. Our ￿rst approach uses a regression discontinuity design relying on
the (presumably random) outcome of close elections as an instrument for tenure length (see
Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw 2001, and Butler, Lee and Moretti 2004 for an application
of regression discontinuity to elections). We ￿nd that legislators who barely won their ￿rst
reelection have a signi￿cantly higher chance of having a relative entering Congress later in
time than legislators who barely lost their ￿rst reelection. In the second approach we in-
strument for whether a legislator￿ s ￿rst reelection attempt is successful using the reelection
rate of fellow party Representatives in the same state and year. The second instrumental
variables approach corroborates our ￿ndings. Overall, we ￿nd that holding legislative power
for more than one term increases the likelihood that a politician will have a relative entering
3Congress in the future by about 70%. Therefore, in politics, power begets power.
A second contribution of the paper is to provide a historical description of political
dynasties in the US Congress. This description highlights the type of society in which
dynasties tend to thrive, and is also useful when assessing the possible channels through
which political power is transmitted. We show that the percentage of dynastic legislators
has signi￿cantly decreased over time (a ￿dynastic￿legislator is one who belongs to a family
that had previously placed a member in Congress). Dynastic legislators were signi￿cantly
more prevalent in the South and in the Senate, consistent with the notion of the South
displaying lower sociopolitical mobility and openness, and the Senate being a more exclusive
body. While the regional di⁄erence disappeared after World War II, the di⁄erence across
chambers remains. We also provide evidence suggesting that dynastic e⁄ects are stronger in
politics than in other occupations. Finally, we ￿nd that dynastic legislators are less common
in congressional delegations coming from states (and times) where there is more political
competition. One possible explanation is that when a party safely controls a state, those in
control of a party can a⁄ord to favor candidates to whom they are connected by family or
social ties. Under more severe competition, party elites cannot a⁄ord strategies other than
￿elding the best possible candidates, regardless of family connections.
Our results shed some light on the channels through which the dynastic transmission
of political power takes place. Because exogenous shocks to dynastic power have an e⁄ect
on dynastic permanence, superior ￿xed traits (i.e., original endowments in terms of genes,
for instance) cannot be the whole explanation for political dynasties in the US Congress.
Cumulative factors that depend on previous power attainment must be at play, possibly
through various channels. The descriptive part of the paper o⁄ers some guidance at assessing
the likelihood of di⁄erent possibilities. It could be that a longer tenure induces a public
service vocation in some family members of a legislator. However, we ￿nd that dynastic
politicians are less likely to have previous public o¢ ce experience. Another possibility is
4that a longer tenure allows a legislator to accumulate an asset that he then bequests￿ like
￿nancial or human capital, name recognition, or contacts. In this paper we do not attempt to
disentangle these various channels. However, the fact that political competition is negatively
correlated with the prevalence of dynastic politicians suggests that dynastic transmission of
political power may be more related to superior contacts with party machines ￿ for example￿
than to features valued by voters, such as higher human capital.
Our ￿nding that shocks to political power have persistent e⁄ects through posterior fam-
ily attainment has multiple implications for our understanding of political dynamics. First,
while the inheritance of political power is considered by many to be un-democratic, we ￿nd
that existing democratic processes still allow for the de facto inheritance of political power.
This inheritance is potentially troublesome for those concerned with the legitimacy of the
process by which representation is achieved, regardless of any impact on policy.3 Second,
granting political power to new social groups may entail a transfer of power to their descen-
dants. As a result, institutions that extend political representation￿ even if temporarily￿ may
have long-lasting e⁄ects and therefore be hard to reverse. This in turn o⁄ers an explana-
tion for why democratization may work as a commitment device. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006a) explain the rise of democracy in Western nations relying on the key assumption
that democratization yields a commitment to future redistribution. Self-perpetuation o⁄ers
one justi￿cation for that crucial assumption by showing that changes in representation may
be persistent. Lastly, political mistakes by confused electorates may impose costs that are
more long-lasting than simply conferring o¢ ce to a bad candidate (see Wolfers 2002 on how
voters reelect lucky, but not necessarily talented, incumbents). More generally, and similar
to work on political selection and incumbency advantage (discussed below), our paper con-
tributes to the understanding of forces shaping the political class. This is important given
recent evidence that the identity of political o¢ cials matters in terms of the policies they
3Dal B￿, Foster and Putterman (2007) show in an experimental setting, that given the same rules, subjects
behave di⁄erently depending on the process through which rules were selected.
5implement.4
The next section discusses related literature. Section 3 contains our descriptive contri-
bution. First we describe our data and document patterns in the evolution and pro￿le of
dynastic legislators. Then we compare dynastic e⁄ects in Congress to those in other occu-
pations, and examine the connection between political competition and dynastic prevalence.
Section 4 contains our analysis of self-perpetuation. First we present a simple framework that
clari￿es our de￿nition of self-perpetuation and the challenges to its empirical identi￿cation.
Then we present the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Work on the link between family relations and political power is to our knowledge scarce.
Camp (1982) documents that high percentages of Mexican political leaders between 1935 and
1980 belonged to politically established families. Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn (1969) use
biographical data of US legislators and look at the percentage of legislators belonging to
politically connected families. They describe the evolution of that magnitude over time and
across regions of the US until 1961, and argue that the observed decrease cannot simply
be explained by population growth. In their view, the decrease re￿ ects modernization.
Brandes Crook and Hibbing (1997) look at the impact of the election mode of Senators on
a number of dimensions, including the percentage of Senators coming from families that
had placed a legislator before. Washington (2005) examines another connection between
family and politics: she shows that US legislators who have relatively more daughters take
more progressive stances on women issues. Our work is also related to recent advances on
the theory and evidence of legislative careers (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 2005, Merlo and
4Jones and Olken (2005) show that national leaders appear to have large impacts on national growth.
Pande (2003) shows that the group membership of legislators a⁄ects targeted redistribution. Chattopadhyay
and Du￿ o (2004) show that the gender of village leaders a⁄ects the composition of public goods. Besley,
Persson and Sturm (2005) report substantial impacts of governors on the economic performance of states.
6Mattozzi 2005, and Snyder and Padr￿ i Miquel 2006) and the composition of the political
class (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2005, Caselli and Morelli 2004, Dal B￿ and Di Tella 2003,
Dal B￿ et al. 2006). Also related is a paper by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) who o⁄er
a model of the persistence of elite power through investments in political in￿ uence.
Our paper is related to the incumbency advantage literature in that we attempt to mea-
sure the e⁄ect of political attainment on future political prospects (see, among many others,
Erikson 1971, Gelman and King 1990, Levitt and Wolfram 1997, and Ansolabehere, Snyder,
and Stewart 2000). An important di⁄erence with the incumbency advantage literature is that
we identify a spillover e⁄ect that is interpersonal rather than intrapersonal. As such, our
work underscores the social network dimension, given by family ties, of the e⁄ects that cur-
rent political selection has on the future political class. As most papers in the incumbency
advantage literature, we focus on identifying the e⁄ect, and abstract from the interesting
problem of its direct consequences (an exception is King and Gelman 1991 who speci￿cally
investigate the impact of incumbency advantage on political responsiveness and partisan
bias).
Finally, our work is also related to a vast empirical literature measuring within family
income correlations across generations (see for instance Solon 1999, and references therein),
and to a vast literature in sociology that has measured intergenerational mobility across
occupations and status levels (see Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991 for a survey).5
Our inquiry is analogous but focused on correlations in political power attainment within
families (although our approach contains intragenerational e⁄ects as well). Dynastic self-
perpetuation represents a way in which (political) inequality across families is reproduced
over time. Although our results do not necessarily imply that the reproduction of political
inequality contributes to the reproduction of economic inequality, our paper does expand the
5There is also a large theoretical literature on the intergenerational transmission of income (see, inter alia,
Becker and Tomes 1979, Loury 1981, Galor and Zeira 1993, FernÆndez and Rogerson 2001, and Mookherjee
and Ray (2003); for a network-based perspective, see Calv￿-Armengol and Jackson 2005).
7study of the reproduction of inequality to a new dimension. Going beyond the measurement
of correlations, we also show that shocks a⁄ecting the political power of a person will have a
causal e⁄ect spilling over to family members (see Currie and Moretti 2003 for how education
shocks have intergenerational spillover e⁄ects).
3 Data and description
3.1 Data sources and key variables
The data for this project come from multiple sources. First, the Congressional Biographical
Database (ICPSR study 7803) contains data on every legislator from 1789 to 1996. This
dataset contains basic biographical information such as year of birth, prior experience, and
whether or not a legislator had relatives that were also in Congress. These data were checked
against the Congressional Biographical Directory, which has detailed information on the
family connections of legislators. Our dataset does not detail all of a legislator￿ s family links,
but the ICPSR study includes a selected family tie for each legislator. This information is
captured in Table 1, which gives an idea of what type of connections are more frequent. We
observe that almost 95% of the reported family relationships can be categorized as close.
We create two indicator variables to characterize political dynasties: Postrelatives and
Prerelatives. The former is equal to one whenever a legislator has a relative entering Congress
after he did, and zero otherwise. The latter is equal to one whenever a legislator had a
relative enter Congress before he did, and zero otherwise. Even when these variables may
be considered coarse, in the next subsection we show that their historical and geographic
variation is intuitive. This suggests that our key variables do capture useful information.
Approximately 8:7% of legislators had previous relatives in o¢ ce (Prerelatives) and 8:5% had
relatives entering Congress later (Postrelatives) ￿ see Table 2). Table 2 also shows that 65%
of legislators stay in Congress for more than one term. A term for House Representatives is
8one congress (two years), and three congresses (six years) for a Senator. The average tenure
length (in congresses) is 3:73. We now de￿ne two variables that will be used frequently:
Longtermi is a dummy variable equal to one if legislator i stayed in Congress for more than
one term, and Total tenure is a variable recording the total number of congresses served by
a legislator.
Table 3 displays information on notable congressional dynasties. The Breckinridge family
is the ￿ largest￿political dynasty in terms of both the number of members placed in Congress
(17) and the total number of congresses served (72). Its presence in Congress spans the
period from 1789 to 1978. Other notable families in Congress are associated to the names
Aldrich, Frelinghuysen, Hiester, Kennedy and Lodge.
In order to instrument for tenure length in our study of self-perpetuation in Section 4, we
merged the biographical data with data from the Candidate and Constituency Statistics of
Elections in the United States (ICPSR study 7757). Since these two databases do not have
common individual identi￿ers, we employed a complex merging procedure which is detailed
in the appendix. For the universe of House elections we were able to match 28;560 elections
out of the possible 30;028 that occurred.6
In subsection 3:3 we use data from the General Social Survey (ICPSR study 4295) in
order to compare dynastic e⁄ects across occupations.
Finally we merged in an additional data set that was used to construct the measure of
political competition used in subsection 3:4. This dataset contains the party a¢ liations of
members of state houses and senates from 1880 until 1994 and was merged by state and
congressional term.7
6We only found minor di⁄erences among observables between elections that merged and those that did
not, save for the fact that elections that did not merge correctly seemed to occur earlier in our sample.
This is consistent with the quality of recording being poorer earlier in time. Otherwise the missing elections
appear to be random. In our instrumental variables studies we restrict our sample to House elections only.
This is done mainly because before 1910 very few Senators were directly elected, but were selected into o¢ ce
by state legislatures. Thus for the most part including them in our sample would add only a few data points
and introduce comparability issues.
7This dataset was generously provided by Rui De Figueiredo and was originally collected by him and
93.2 Historical evolution
We document the presence of political dynasties in Congress across time, regions, chambers
of congress and the two main political parties. Consistently with Clubok, Wilensky and
Berghorn (1969), we ￿nd that the proportion of legislators with relatives in Congress has
signi￿cantly decreased over time (see Figure 1A). We also ￿nd that this is true for the
proportion of legislators with previous and posterior relatives (see Figure 1B and 1C). We
refer to legislators who had a previous relative in congress as ￿dynastic legislators.￿As shown
in Figure 1B and Table 4 there has been a signi￿cant decrease over time in the presence of
dynastic legislators: while 12% of legislators were dynastic between 1789 and 1858, only 6%
were dynastic after 1966.
There are regional di⁄erences in the presence of dynastic legislators. Dynastic legislators
used to be more prevalent in the South than in the rest of the country. This di⁄erence is
signi￿cant before the Civil War and between the end of Reconstruction and World War II (see
Figure 2A and ￿rst panel of Table 4). Contrary to the trends portrayed by Clubok, Wilensky
and Berghorn (1969), we ￿nd that regional di⁄erences in the presence of dynastic legislators
have disappeared over time. The ￿rst panel of Table 4 shows that regional di⁄erences in
the presence of dynastic legislators are not signi￿cant after World War II. However, the
di⁄erences across regions regarding the entrance to Congress of dynastic politicians only
disappeared after the civil rights movement -see the second panel of Table 4. The contrast
suggests that the immediate postwar years generated a substantial exit of senior dynastic
politicians.
There are important di⁄erences across chambers of Congress. The Senate has a greater
share of dynastic politicians than the House and this di⁄erence has not disappeared with time
(see Figure 2B and Table 4). Finally, dynastic legislators were signi￿cantly more prevalent
in the Democratic party than in the Republican party until the end of Reconstruction, but
Brian Gaines. It has been used in De Figueiredo (2003) and De Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh (2004).
10there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences across parties since then (see Figure 2C and Table 4).
The higher dynastic component of the Democratic party in the 19th century disappears if
one excludes Southern legislators.
3.3 Dynastic prevalence across occupations
Even when looking at legislators elected in the 1990s, we ￿nd that nearly 5% of legislators
have previous legislators in the family, but one may ask whether dynasties are any more
prevalent in politics than in other professions. While a full comparative study of the inter-
generational transmission of occupations is beyond the scope of this paper, in this subsection
we o⁄er some evidence suggesting that dynastic prevalence among legislators is indeed high
when compared to other occupations.8
Table 5 presents data for the years 1972-2004 from the General Social Surveys (ICPSR
study 4295) corresponding to a selected group of occupations. Column (1) reports the
percentage of respondents in each occupation whose father was in the same occupation.
According to this data more than 12% of doctors have fathers who were doctors, while less
than 2% of economists have fathers that were economists. But to compare the importance
of dynastic e⁄ects across occupations one must control for the share of the population in
each profession (i.e. the fact that economists are much less common than doctors). Column
(2) reports the percentage of fathers in each occupation (note that, indeed, economists are a
lot less common among fathers than doctors). Column (3) then reports the ratio of column
(1) over column (2), which controls for the relative frequency of occupations among fathers.
This ratio represents the odds that both son and father are in the same profession relative
to the benchmark situation where the professions of respondents are independent from those
8Sociologists have written extensively on correlations of socioeconomic status (see for instance Ganzeboom
et al. 1991). These studies tend to focus on coarse categories (manual workers, say), status, or income
rather than on particular occupations. Galor and Tsiddon (1997) o⁄er a theory linking skill premia and
intergenerational occupational mobility.
11of their fathers.9 Notice that the adjusted dynastic prevalence index in column (3), or what
we call ￿ dynastic bias,￿is higher for economists than for doctors: although doctors have
fathers who were doctors roughly six times more often than economists have fathers who
were economists, doctors were roughly ten times more common among fathers, so dynastic
e⁄ects appear to play a larger role in economics than in medicine.10
The last row contains data for legislators. Column (1) presents the percentage of legis-
lators elected in the 1990s who had fathers who were legislators. In column (2) we report
a conservative estimate of the percentage of fathers who were legislators. We explain in
the appendix our calculations to estimate this ￿gure.11 The dynastic bias is strongest for
legislators relative to all other selected occupations. The dynastic bias is more than seven
times stronger for legislators than for economists, the second most ￿dynastic￿occupation
in our group, and more than ten times stronger than for doctors, the third most dynastic
profession in our sample. Even if we assumed that, among fathers, legislators were exactly
as common as economists, we would obtain a dynastic bias that is almost twice as strong
for legislators than for economists.
9To see why column (3) can be read this way, consider a matrix where we have the profession of sons
in rows and the profession of fathers in columns. Denote the content of cell (i;j) with F (i;j), which
captures the fraction of individuals where the son has profession i and the father has profession j. Denote
with FI (i;j) = f (i)g (j) what that fraction would be if the professions of fathers and sons were selected
independently, where g (j) is the fraction of fathers with profession j, and f (i) is the fraction of sons with
profession i. The chance that both son and father will be in profession i relative to what that same chance





Column (1) reports the magnitude
F(i;i)
f(i) , column (2) reports the magnitude g (i), and column (3), being the
ratio of columns (1) and (2), reports each profession￿ s dynastic bias
F(i;i)
f(i)g(i).
10This is not to say that our measure of dynastic bias is driven by the rarity of the profession. Note that
a profession￿ s rarity a⁄ects both the numerator and the denominator of its dynastic bias index
F(i;i)
f(i)g(i).
11We used a methodology that takes an extremely conservative position at every step. In fact it yields an
estimate indicating that, among fathers, there was a legislator for every four economists. This is clearly a
gross overestimation. For example, US universities granted nearly 24;000 Masters and PhDs in Economics
between 1910 and 1952 (Bowen 1953, p. 23), while only 2;410 legislators were elected in the same period.
123.4 Personal characteristics and political careers of dynastic politi-
cians
In this section we study how the personal characteristics and the political careers of dynastic
legislators di⁄er from those of other legislators. We study the following characteristics. House
is a dummy variable equal to one if the legislator entered through the House. Age of entry
is the age of the legislator the year he/she entered Congress. Previous public experience is
a dummy variable equal to one if the legislator had public experience at the time of entry
to Congress. College degree is a dummy variable equal to one if the legislator had a college
degree. Outsider is a dummy variable equal to one if the legislator was from a di⁄erent state
than the one he represents. Female is a dummy variable equal to one if the legislator is a
woman.
Given the di⁄erence across regions and times in the number of dynastic politicians, simple
comparisons of means of the previous variables may be misleading. It is necessary to control
by year and state in which the legislator is observed.12 Table 6 shows OLS regression results
of how legislator characteristics relate to having a previous relative in Congress, including
state and year ￿xed e⁄ects.13 We ￿nd that dynastic politicians are less likely to start their
career in the House, suggesting they have the ability or means to enter directly through the
Senate, a much smaller and more prestigious body. This di⁄erence cannot be attributed
to a later entry into Congress: dynastic legislators enter Congress at about 44 years of
age, just like non-dynastic legislators. Dynastic legislators are not more likely to come
from a state di⁄erent than the one they represent and are signi￿cantly less likely to have
previous public experience, although they are more likely to have a college degree. Moreover,
12The ￿year￿e⁄ects are in fact the years in which each congress was elected, so they are a dummy for
every two years corresponding to the same congress. The ￿rst one corresponds to the year 1788 (the year
in which the 1st congress, which began operations in 1789, was elected). The second one corresponds to the
year 1790, etc. For brevity, we refer to congress e⁄ects as year e⁄ects throughout.
13A norm in the US Congress has allowed for close relatives like wives to enter Congress and occupy
the seat of a legislator who died in o¢ ce. We exclude these cases wherever appropriate to ensure that the
dynastic e⁄ects we study do not depend on this obvious form of dynastic transmission.
13dynastic legislators with a college education are signi￿cantly more likely to have attended
an Ivy League school than the rest of the college educated legislators (unreported in the
table). It may be interesting to note that dynastic legislators are signi￿cantly more likely
to be female than nondynastic ones. In other words, dynastic membership seems to have
facilitated the di¢ cult progress of female political representation. In addition, we ￿nd that
dynastic legislators do not have longer careers in Congress. Table 7 shows that dynastic
politicians are equally likely to stay in Congress for more than one term and have similar
tenure lengths to those of other legislators.
3.5 Dynastic prevalence and political competition
In this section we study the connection between political competition and political dynasties.
We ￿nd that increases in political competition are associated with fewer political dynasties,
suggesting that political competition reduces the dynastic transmission of political power.
For this analysis we use a political competition index constructed upon party dominance
of state legislatures between the years 1880 and 1996. This index has a minimum value of
￿0:5 when 100% of the seats in the state legislature in a given year belong to the same
party. This index increases as the percentage of seats held by a majority party decreases.
The maximum value of the index is zero, corresponding to the case when the total number
of seats (including the two chambers) held by the two largest parties is split 50-50 between
these two parties. More formally, the political competition index for state i and year j is




￿ ￿ ￿, where LHDij (LHRij) and UHDij
(UHRij) represent the number of seats that Democrats (Republicans) hold in the lower and
upper chambers of the state legislature that was elected in year j. This measure of political
competiton is superior to simply using the vote shares of national legislators which may
depend on the characteristics of those legislators.
Figure 3 shows the (uncontrolled) association between political competition and the pro-
14portion of legislators coming from families that had placed legislators before. This ￿gure
shows that as the index moves from -0.5 to 0 (i.e., as political competition increases) the
percentage of politicians coming from politically established families decreases. Table 8
presents estimates of the association between the percentage of legislators who are elected
to Congress in year j in state i, and the political competition in the same state-year. The
￿rst two speci￿cations, in columns (1) and (2) respectively, capture the political competition
index through a quadratic polynomial and show that political competition is a signi￿cant
predictor of the prevalence of dynastic politicians even after controlling for year and state
e⁄ects.
In columns (3) and (4) we report estimates from a regression of the percentage of leg-
islators with Prerelatives on a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the political
competition index takes a value in the upper half of its support (i.e., above ￿0:25). The
omitted dummy is the one corresponding to the ￿rst, or less competitive, half of the sup-
port. These estimates suggest that moving from districts with less competition to districts
with more competition lowers the prevalence of dynastic politicians in about two percentage
points. In the speci￿cations where we exclude observations lying within thirty years of the
constitution of the state we eliminate a censoring problem, as states with no previous politi-
cal elite will tend to have low levels of dynastic politicians. The speci￿cations in columns (2)
and (4) take care of that problem and the constant indicates that the proportion of dynastic
politicians in the less competitive states is around 10%. Thus, the reduction in dynastic
prevalence brought about by an increase in competition that moves a state from the lower
half to the upper half of the support amounts to almost 20% of the baseline proportion.
One possible explanation of our ￿ndings is that when a party safely controls a state, the
state and national leadership of the party can a⁄ord to favor ￿elite￿candidates with whom
they are connected by family or social ties. Because these candidates may not always be
the best, favoring them costs the party leadership some extra probability of not winning a
15seat. In very safe states, this cost is negligible, however, while the private returns to favoring
friends and family may be substantial.14 The party leadership at the state and national level
can favor particular legislative candidates is various ways, such as by directing resources
to those candidates at the primary campaign stage. Under more severe competition, the
party leadership may not be able to a⁄ord any strategy other than ￿elding the best possible
candidates, regardless of their family connections. Doing otherwise may cost the party too
much in terms of a larger likelihood of losing seats in Congress, which damages the party￿ s
power both at the state and national level. In other words, dynastic prevalence may re￿ ect
the prevalence of lower quality politicians due to constraints on political competition (this is
compatible with the results and explanation of Besley, Persson and Sturm 2005, who study
how political competition relates to the quality of governors in the United States).
4 Self-perpetuation
Mosca (1966 [1896]) observed that even representative regimes would comprise a tension
between a ￿democratic tendency￿and an ￿aristocratic tendency.￿Representative systems,
while eliminating the legal inheritability of political rights, could be vulnerable to the emer-
gence of de facto nobilities. This observation speaks squarely to the concern that is often
voiced by the media in connection with the prevalence of political dynasties in the United
States. Mosca saw the aristocratic tendency associated with the persistence of political
elites as the result of various factors, including personal contacts, notoriety, and insider
information￿ which helped well connected individuals in their rise to power. But such per-
sistent inequality in political attainment across families may also follow from di⁄erences in
talent and drive that run in families. Therefore, substantiating the idea that representative
14A related problem occurs in family ￿rms. Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) study a model where
￿rm owners can decide to place a heir as manager, rather than a professional, at the cost of worse managerial
performance. Bennedsen et al (2006) estimate that cost to be large using a sample of Danish ￿rms. See also
Bertrand and Schoar (2006) and references therein.
16systems embody an aristocratic tendency that is a result of previous access to power requires
showing that the persistence of elites is not wholly due to heterogeneity across dynasties. In
other words, we need to show that self-perpetuation e⁄ects are present.
4.1 Self-perpetuation: de￿nition and main estimation challenges
We de￿ne self-perpetuation as a power-treatment e⁄ect, whereby holding political power
increases the probability that one￿ s heirs attain political power in the future regardless of
dynastic characteristics. In other words, political self-perpetuation means that power begets
power.
We now present a simple model that clari￿es the nature of the self-perpetuation e⁄ect
and highlights challenges in its empirical identi￿cation.
Assume that the amount of political power yi enjoyed by citizen i depends on the amount
of political capital ki available to him,
yi = ￿ + ￿ki + ￿i;
where ￿ is a positive scalar and ￿i is a random shock. Political capital is de￿ned as any
personal characteristic that has an e⁄ect on political attainment, from human capital to
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i = ￿ki + ￿y;
17where ￿ and ￿ are scalars. From the previous two equations we ￿nd the relationship between
the political power of the successors and the political capital and attainment of predecessors,
y
s
i = ￿ + ￿￿ki + ￿￿yi + ￿
s
i: (1)
The last equation says that the political attainment of a successor depends on the political
capital of her predecessor, and the contribution to her own political capital made by her
predecessors￿political power yi. In this simple world, our hypothesis that political elites are
self-perpetuating would be true whenever ￿ > 0, indicating that the political capital of a
successor, and hence her political power attainment, is augmented by her predecessor￿ s power.
This is the precise sense in which self-perpetuation implies that power begets power. Even
if ￿ = 0, it might still be true that in some dynasty both the predecessor and the successor
have high levels of political attainment yi and ys
i due to a high level of original political
capital ki. The last equation then clari￿es the distinction between the idea that persistence
in dynastic political attainment re￿ ects inheritable heterogeneity in dynasty types (￿ > 0)
from our hypothesis of self-perpetuation (￿ > 0).
The possibility that di⁄erent families may have di⁄erent and unobserved amounts of
political capital poses a problem when attempting to test the idea of self-perpetuation. A




i = a1 + a2yi + ui; (2)
where ui is the error term. The researcher may interpret a positive estimate of a2 as evidence
of self-perpetuation (￿ > 0). However the estimation of the e⁄ect of yi on ys
i will be biased
given the omitted variable ki, the political capital of the predecessor. To better understand
what an OLS estimate of a2 would re￿ ect, we can write ki =
yi￿￿￿￿i




i = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (￿ + ￿￿)yi ￿ ￿￿i + ￿
s
i;
which indicates that the naive regression would yield an estimate of a2 = ￿ + ￿￿. It follows
that even if there is no cumulative e⁄ect of power on political capital (i.e., ￿ = 0) we would
obtain a2 = ￿ > 0 due to the fact that the predecessor￿ s political capital ki that a⁄ects
power attainment is inheritable (￿ > 0). Thus, our estimation strategy needs to control for
characteristics of the predecessor that may a⁄ect the power attainment of both predecessors
and successors.
Note that self-perpetuation (￿ > 0) a⁄ects the forces behind the formation of the political
class. We can write the political attainment of successors as,
y
s
i = ￿ + ￿￿ki + ￿￿ [￿ + ￿ki + ￿i] + ￿
s
i (3)
= ￿(1 + ￿￿) + ￿ (￿ + ￿￿)ki + ￿￿￿i + ￿
s
i: (4)
This last expression reveals that when power augments political capital (￿ > 0) the po-
litical power of successors is enhanced through three channels: ￿rst, by enhancing the e⁄ect
of the constant that a⁄ects power through the term ￿(1 + ￿￿); second, by enhancing the
e⁄ect of the predecessor￿ s political capital through the term ￿ (￿ + ￿￿)ki; and third, by cap-
italizing on the good luck of predecessors through the term ￿￿￿i. A positive estimate of ￿
would provide evidence that holding political power reinforces the e⁄ects of other sources of
elite persistence such as di⁄ering dynastic traits, and that past luck matters for the future
distribution of power.
4.2 Self-perpetuation: OLS estimates
Because of data limitations, we focus not on the universe of citizens but on the universe
of politicians who served in the US Congress. The variation in legislators￿political power
19is measured by their tenure length since it is typically argued that tenure in congressional
o¢ ce is associated with more political power (more senior legislators develop more name
recognition, become more deeply embedded in party networks, and obtain more in￿ uential
committee positions). We construct measures of political power by seeing whether the leg-
islator was reelected at least once and by counting the number of total congresses served
(through, respectively, our variables Longtermi and Total tenurei, both introduced in the
descriptive section of our paper). As a measure of the political power of the succesors we
consider whether the legislator has relatives attaining congressional o¢ ce in the future at
all.15 This is captured by the the variable Postrelatives, which we also introduced in the
descriptive section of the paper.
In this section we study the relationship between tenure in Congress and the probability
of having relatives in Congress in the future by estimating the following OLS regression:
Postrelativei = a1 + a2Longtermi + a3Xi + bs + by + "i:
Recall that Postrelativei is a dummy variable equal to one if legislator i has a relative
in Congress in the future, and as said before, Longtermi is a dummy variable equal to one
if legislator i stayed in Congress for more than one term, and Xi is a vector of legislator
i￿ s personal characteristics. The coe¢ cients bs and by are state and year ￿xed e⁄ects that
are used in certain speci￿cations. The symbol "i represents the error term.16 As explained
in the previous section, a2 is likely to be a biased estimate of ￿, but the reporting of OLS
estimates is useful to establish whether there is at least the potential for self-perpetuation
15The reason for using this measure instead of the average tenure of a legislator￿ s successors is that each
legislator typically has many relatives most of whom will not enter Congress and therefore are not in our
data.
16The use of binary outcome variables would suggest that non-linear maximum likelihood methods would
be desirable. However, the consistency of these estimators is dubious in the analysis of panel data; this is
the well known incidental parameters problem (see Neyman and Scott, 1948, or Lancaster, 2000). Therefore
we focus on the analysis using ordinary least squares; however, the results are robust to using a potentially
inconsistent probit estimator.
20to be present. A coe¢ cient a2 that is not signi￿cantly larger than zero would make self-
perpetuation unlikely.
Table 9 column (1) shows that 7:1% of the legislators that were in Congress for only one
term had a relative entering Congress after them while that percentage increases to 9:3% if
the legislator stayed in o¢ ce for more than one term; the di⁄erence is signi￿cant at the 1%
level. Columns (2) and (3) show a similar comparison when we eliminate people born after
1910 and those who died in o¢ ce. We eliminate people born after 1910 so as to account for
the censoring that occurs because legislators at the end of the sample period have less time
to establish dynasties. We omit individuals who died in o¢ ce to ensure that our results are
not driven by the convention that when an individual dies in o¢ ce a relative might step in
to take his place. The coe¢ cient estimates remain largely unchanged and are statistically
equivalent.
Column (4) reports a regression controlling for state and year ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿xed
e⁄ects do not change the results markedly. When further controls are added in column (5)
the estimate of a2 does not change. This suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to bias
upwards our estimate of the e⁄ect of tenure on having relatives in future congresses.
Other personal characteristics correlate with having relatives in future congresses. Leg-
islators with Prerelatives are 16% more likely to have Postrelatives. Senators and legislators
whose chamber of entry was the House but eventually moved to the Senate have a 5% and
6:8% higher probability, respectively, of having a relative entering Congress relative to leg-
islators who were only members of the House. These ￿ndings suggest that more successful
career patterns (politicians who are always Senators or who start as Representatives but
eventually ascend to the Senate) are associated with a higher likelihood of starting or con-
tinuing a dynasty. One potential problem with the speci￿cation used so far is that the
error terms of legislators belonging to the same family may not be independent, a⁄ecting
the standard errors. To address this issue we report in column (6) estimates with only one
21observation per family (we eliminate all legislators who have themselves previous relatives
in o¢ ce). The results are unchanged.
We obtain similar results if we use the total number of congresses served, total tenure, as
a measure of political power. Figure 4 shows the proportion of legislators with Postrelatives
by the number of terms they served. There is a clear positive relationship between total
tenure and Postrelatives with the impact of terms decreasing with the number of terms
served. Table 10 presents the regression estimates, which are similar to those in Table 9.
Starting in column (6) we also run the results using a quadratic term of total tenure. The
quadratic term is negative and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, re￿ ecting the fact that there
are decreasing marginal returns to tenure in terms of future relatives in o¢ ce. The marginal
impact on the probability of a relative entering Congress in the future of going from one
term to two terms is between 1:3% and 3%.
Overall, the OLS results yield evidence consistent with self-perpetuation. However, as
argued before, the fact that legislators with longer tenures are more likely to have relatives
in future congresses could be due to unobserved family characteristics such as their political
capital. In the following two subsections we employ two strategies to determine whether
tenure in o¢ ce has a causal impact on the probability that a legislator￿ s relative will enter
Congress in the future. First, we focus on House Representatives that attempted a reelection
and compare those that barely won their ￿rst reelection with those that barely lost, that
is, we use a regression discontinuity approach. Second, we use the re-election rates of a
legislator￿ s cohort as an instrument for a legislator￿ s re-election.
4.3 Establishing a causal link: Close elections
To identify the causal impact of tenure we start by using a very simple approach that relies
on a comparison between legislators who barely won their ￿rst reelection with those who
barely lost. The identifying assumption in this regression discontinuity analysis is that close
22elections provide a random assignment of legislators across the categories of winners and
losers, instead of being driven by family characteristics. This assumption could be criticized
if elections were rigged such that winning could depend on personal characteristics that are
also correlated with having Postrelatives. Snyder (2005) ￿nds evidence consistent with the
idea that the vote counting process is biased in favor of long-time incumbents in the U.S.
House. However, there is no evidence of such manipulation taking place in ￿rst re-election
attempts, which is the focus of this study. It could also be argued that legislators with
relatives previously in Congress may be more able to rig election tallies. To eliminate this
possibility we focus on legislators without Prerelatives for the rest of this section. We also
exclude legislators who died in o¢ ce or were born after 1910 as in the previous section.
Table 11 shows the percentage of Congress members with Postrelatives conditional on the
results of the ￿rst reelection attempt (barely lost vs. barely won). Of the legislators that lost
by less than a 2:5% margin of the vote, 2:8% have Postrelatives in Congress. Instead, of those
that won by up to a 2:5% margin, 7:12% have Postrelatives in Congress. A similar increase
is observed for the 5% window and both di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant (p-values of
0:024 and 0:01 respectively).
We argue that in such a small window winners and losers are identical so that any dif-
ference in Postrelatives should be attributed to the di⁄erent outcome in the ￿rst reelection
and not to personal or family characteristics. The data support this assumption. As Table
11 shows, at the 2:5% and 5% windows, only one characteristic out of eleven is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent at the 10% level between winners and losers. This suggests that it is not an un-
observed family characteristic that causes both long tenures and Postrelatives for legislators
winning close reelections, but that staying in power for longer increases the probability of
forming a dynasty.
However, the previous analysis fails to consider that not all losers of a ￿rst reelection were
one-term legislators: some ran again and reentered Congress after losing their ￿rst reelection
23attempt. Therefore, the di⁄erences in Table 11 underestimate the e⁄ect of being a long term
legislator on the chance of having relatives in Congress later in time. To solve this problem
we implement an IV regression in which we estimate the probability of serving more than
one term in Congress as a function of the ￿rst reelection outcome in the ￿rst stage. In a
second stage, we estimate the e⁄ect of Longterm on Postrelative using the predicted value
of Longterm from the ￿rst stage.
We estimate the following equation in the ￿rst stage:
Longtermi = b1 + b2Wi + b3Xi (1 ￿ Wi) + br (1 ￿ Wi) + bd (1 ￿ Wi) + "i;
where Longtermi is an indicator equal to one if legislator i was in Congress for more than one
term, Wi is an indicator equal to one if the legislator won his ￿rst reelection attempt and Xi
is a vector of personal characteristics. The coe¢ cients br and bd are region and decade ￿xed
e⁄ects. All controls including the region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects are interacted with losing.
This is done to adjust for the fact that all winners of the ￿rst reelection attempt had long
term careers, but not all losers had short term careers; in other words, controls are used to
explain variation across losers.17 The default decade is the 1880s and the default region is the
North-East (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Delaware, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania). The coe¢ cient on Wi measures the
average impact of winning on the probability of being a long term legislator conditional on
region and decade e⁄ects.
Table 12 shows the estimated coe¢ cients for the ￿rst stage. Winning the ￿rst reelection
and its interactions are a good predictor of staying in Congress for more than one term at the
2:5% and 5% windows, after controlling for various legislator characteristics. The explanatory
variables of the ￿rst stages are jointly signi￿cant with F statistics always greater than 60.
17Since all winners have Longterm = 1 and all personal characteristics and ￿xed e⁄ects are interacted
with losing, b1 + b2 = 1.
24The instruments are strong.
The equation we estimate in the second stage is as follows:
Postrelativei = a1 + a2 \ Longtermi + a3Xi + ar + ad + "i;
where \ Longtermi is the estimated probability of having more than one term in o¢ ce as
predicted by the ￿rst stage. In these regressions we use region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects in
order to minimize problems with statistical power. We do however incorporate state and
year ￿xed e⁄ects in subsequent speci￿cations with more observations.
Table 13 shows the estimated coe¢ cients for the second stage. Being in Congress for
more than one term has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of having a Postrelative in
Congress. This is the case for both the 2:5% and 5% margin of votes windows and whether
or not we control for observable characteristics or we include legislators with Prerelatives.
The magnitude of the e⁄ect ranges from 3:1% to 5:2%.
We obtain similar results if we use the total number of terms served and its square. In
the ￿rst stage we estimate the following equations:











4Xi (1 ￿ Wi) + br + bd + c
0
r (1 ￿ Wi) + c
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d (1 ￿ Wi) + "i;
where Totaltenure2
i is the square of Totaltenurei. We present the estimates from the ￿rst
stage in Table 14. The explanatory variables of the ￿rst stages are jointly signi￿cant with F
statistics always greater than 20. Again, the instruments are strong.
In the second stage we estimate the following equation:
Postrelativei = a1 + a2 \ Totaltenurei + a
0
2 \ Totaltenure2
i + a3Xi + ar + ad + "i:
25Table 15 shows the estimated coe¢ cients from the second stage. The linear e⁄ect of an
extra term in power on the probability of having a Postrelative ranges from 3:9% to 6:3%.
The marginal e⁄ect of a second term in power (denoted as TE(2-1) in Table 15) is positive,
ranging from 2:8% to 4:2%, and always signi￿cant at the 10% level.
The results presented this far are based on legislators within a small window of victory or
defeat in their ￿rst reelection (vote margins of 2:5% or 5%). We next include more legislators
(within 25% margin of victory or defeat).18 This sample includes legislators that won or lost
by large margins and therefore the reelection outcome cannot be thought to be random. We
then control for the direct e⁄ect that the margin of votes may have on whether a legislator
has Postrelatives by including a high order polynomial in the margin of votes. In other
words, we apply the global polynomial estimation technique developed by Hahn, Todd and
Van der Klaauw (2001) (see also Van der Klaauw 2002).
Figure 5 shows the proportion of legislators with Postrelatives in Congress depending
on the margin of votes by which they won or lost their ￿rst reelection attempt. The ￿gure
also shows the estimated quartic polynomial on vote margin with a 95% con￿dence interval
allowing for a discontinuity at the 0% margin of votes. There is a clear discontinuity at that
value: winners are more likely to have relatives coming into Congress later on even when
the polynomial is absorbing any direct e⁄ect that the margin of votes (or the variables that
cause it) may have on Postrelatives.
However, Figure 5 fails to control for other observable characteristics and the fact that
not all losers had only one term in o¢ ce. To solve this problem we utilize, as before, the
result from the ￿rst reelection to estimate the probability of being a long term legislator.
Figure 6 shows the relationship of Longterm and Total tenure with the margin of votes
that legislators obtain in their ￿rst reelection attempt. The ￿gure also shows the estimated
18We chose the 25% window a priori since a large fraction of the observations fall in this interval and data
with extreme vote margins seem less reliable. As we will show, the results that follow are not speci￿c to that
window.
26quartic polynomial with a 95% con￿dence interval. There is a clear discontinuity at 0%:
winners go on to have a longer tenure than losers. Thus, we can use the result from the ￿rst
reelection attempt as an instrument for tenure and be able to identify the e⁄ect of tenure on
Postrelatives as before.
The equation we estimate in the ￿rst stage is as follows:




s (1 ￿ Wi)+br (1 ￿ Wi)+bd (1 ￿ Wi)+"i;
where the q0s are coe¢ cients in the vote margin polynomial (set to a quartic).
Table 16 shows the estimated coe¢ cients. Win predicts becoming a long term legislator
in the 25% window when controlling for the margin of votes. This is robust to including
state and year ￿xed e⁄ects, legislators with Prerelatives and larger margin of vote windows.
Again, the F statistics for joint signi￿cance are large.
In the second stage we estimate the following equation:




s + ar + ad + "i;
where the t0s are coe¢ cients in the (quartic) vote margin polynomial.
The second stage results in Table 17 show a clear positive e⁄ect of Longterm on Postrel-
atives. In the 25% window, Longterm is signi￿cant with a magnitude ranging from 4:7%
to 6:6%. In the 40% window the e⁄ect of Longterm is also signi￿cant and with similar
magnitude.
These results are robust to considering Total tenure instead of Longterm ￿ see tables 18
and 19. The linear e⁄ect of an extra term in power on the probability of having a Postrelative
ranges from 2:2% to 4:9%. The marginal e⁄ect of a second term in the House is positive,
ranging from 1:6% to 3:7%, and always signi￿cant.
These results suggest that the longer one￿ s tenure, the more likely one is to establish
27a political dynasty, and that this relationship is causal. The identifying assumption in our
analysis is that close elections provide a random assignment of legislators across the categories
of winners and losers. We provided evidence of this for small windows in Table 11. To provide
further evidence in support of this assumption, we estimate the relationship between tenure
and all personal characteristics using the regression discontinuity design. The estimated
model always includes a quartic polynomial on vote margin.19 We present the estimates in
Table 20 with region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects. First, we ￿nd that the estimates of the impact
of Longterm on Postrelatives are robust to considering large windows (in small windows the
coe¢ cients remain high but the much higher standard errors damage signi￿cance). Second,
for some windows one out of nine observables appears unbalanced. However, such imbalances
are not robust to using larger windows. Another robustness check is to introduce state and
year ￿xed e⁄ects (instead of region and decade ￿xed e⁄ects). When we do this (unreported)
we ￿nd that while the e⁄ect of Longterm on Postrelative continues to be signi￿cant for most
vote margin windows with many observations, the imbalances in predetermined observables
disappear almost completely. Overall, the e⁄ect of a long term career on having posterior
relatives in o¢ ce appears fairly robust and not the result of noisy data in a particular vote
margin window. On the contrary, the imbalances in the other observables of our sample are
few and not robust.20
19The exercise can be explained thus. If, say, the military are much more prevalent among winners (indi-
cating that the assignment may not be random), then the close connection between winning and Longterm
should make Longterm as instrumented by Win a signi￿cant variable in a model where Military is the
dependent variable.
20Going beyond our default sample, the examination of Prerelatives across winners and losers does suggest
an imbalance. Legislators with prerelatives tend to be overrepresented among winners. The regressions ran
to check that the results are robust to including legislators with prerelatives control for that characteristic,
however, suggesting that it does not drive the result in those regressions.
284.4 Establishing a causal link: Using the reelection rates of a leg-
islator￿ s cohort
In this section we implement an alternative instrumental variables strategy to estimate the
causal e⁄ect of congressional tenure on having a relative attaining legislative o¢ ce. We use
the reelection probabilities of any given legislator￿ s current cohort, by state and party, as an
instrument for his reelection probabilities.21 For example, consider a House member going
for his ￿rst reelection in California in the year 1892. The instrument for this legislator￿ s ￿rst
reelection is the reelection rate of legislators of the same party in California in the year 1892.
The idea is that there is an underlying common shock to all of the individuals in this cohort
that is independent of the characteristics of the individual attempting to get reelected. We
use this common shock as a source of exogenous variation in congressional tenure to identify
the impact of tenure on having relatives follow into o¢ ce. In our preferred speci￿cation we
include ￿xed e⁄ects by state-decade combinations, so we identify the reelection shock relative
to a given state-decade.22 In the example of the legislator from California in 1892, we would
only compare the shock in California in 1892 to other shocks in California in the 1890￿ s.
The identifying assumption is that the current electoral shocks to an individual￿ s cohort
will a⁄ect his probability of having a relative coming into o¢ ce only through the channel of
whether the legislator stays in o¢ ce or not.
We use the following formula to construct the instrument for legislator i within a state/year/party







where reelectj is a dummy variable equal to one if j, in the same state/year/party, was
21A similar strategy was used by Levitt and Snyder (1997) to examine the impact of federal spending on
electoral outcomes.
22One speci￿cation looks at state-quarter pairs. We do not have enough observations so as to try state-year
￿xed e⁄ects.
29reelected. This formula gives the probability of an individual in the cohort being reelected.23
In our preferred speci￿cation, we estimate the ￿rst stage equation:
Longtermi = b1 + b2Electinstrumenti + b3Xi + bsd + "i;
where bsd captures state-decade ￿xed e⁄ects. Thus we obtain the impact of the instrument
on Longterm only within a given state-decade group. In general the ￿rst stage is quite strong
(Table 21). We ￿nd a highly signi￿cant impact of the reelection instrument on Longterm.
We then proceed to estimate the second stage equation with the instrumented Longterm:
Postrelativei = a1 + a2 \ Longtermi + a3Xi + asd + "i:
We include the state-decade e⁄ects to restrict identifying variation to that in small region-
time groups. Table 22 presents the second stage estimates. Across all of the speci￿cations we
￿nd that the estimate of Longterm is largely consistent with estimates from the regression
discontinuity design approach. In column (1) we use state-quarter of the century e⁄ects while
in column (2) we use our preferred speci￿cation with state-decade e⁄ects. We ￿nd that in
both speci￿cations the results are positive, signi￿cant, and of the same order of magnitude as
our previous regression discontinuity estimates. However somewhat surprisingly in column
(3) we ￿nd that when we exclude individuals with previous relatives the results become
weaker and the estimate becomes insigni￿cant. This stands in contrast to our previous
regression discontinuity speci￿cation. However we cannot refute that any of the estimates
di⁄er within Table 22 or across the di⁄erent approaches. Column (4) reports our overall
preferred speci￿cation, which excludes individuals whose Postrelatives entered within ten
years of the ￿rst individual￿ s ￿rst reelection. This exclusion attempts to rule out cases where
the shock to a legislator￿ s reelection could have a direct e⁄ect on the entry of a posterior
23This of course subtracts out the result of the individual for whom the instrument is being created.
30relative through a channel other than the legislator￿ s tenure. For example, if shocks are
serially correlated, it could be that a high rate of reelections for Democrats in California
in 1892 is associated with more power accruing to Democrats in general in the immediate
years. Therefore, the Postrelative of a Democratic legislator, being likely to be a Democrat
in California himself, may be more likely to attain power soon afterwards. Given our use
of state-decade e⁄ects, when we focus on relatives that enter more than a decade after the
￿rst reelection attempt occurred, we sever that potential channel. The result in column (4)
is signi￿cant at the 5%. Finally in column (5) we exclude legislators with previous relatives
and exclude entry of posterior relatives within ten years and ￿nd a weaker, though signi￿cant
result. Taken together, these results are consistent with those obtained from the regression
discontinuity approach.
5 Conclusion
We document patterns in the evolution and pro￿le of political dynasties in the Congress
of the United States since its inception in 1789; and provide some evidence that dynastic
e⁄ects are stronger for legislators than for other occupations. We also show that dynastic
legislators are less common under greater political competition. The basic emerging picture
is that dynastic politicians are more prevalent in less open, mobile, and competitive societies,
as well as in the Senate, the more exclusive of the two congressional chambers. We then
explore the dynastic transmission of political power with a focus on the presence of self-
perpetuation. A simple model helps us distinguish between self-perpetuation and other
sources of elite persistence, such as persistent heterogeneity in dynastic traits. We show that
the tenure length of legislators is correlated with the probability of their having a relative
entering Congress in the future. While this correlation could be due to unobserved family
characteristics, two di⁄erent IV strategies allow us to determine that there is an important
31causal component: having a long tenure in Congress increases signi￿cantly the probability of
establishing a dynasty (the e⁄ect is around 70% of the baseline probability). Put di⁄erently,
shocks to political power have persistent e⁄ects. An implication is that the political class is
partly shaped by the luck of previous politicians, and that holding political power reinforces
the e⁄ects of other potential sources of elite persistence such as di⁄ering dynastic traits.
Our results shed some light on the channels through which the dynastic transmission of
political power takes place. First, the fact that there is a causal relationship between tenure
length and the probability of starting or continuing a dynasty shows that superior original
endowments (in terms of genes, for instance) cannot fully explain the observed political
dynasties. Second, the fact that dynastic politicians are less likely to have previous public
o¢ ce experience suggests that dynastic politicians may not be characterized by a stronger
vocation for public service. This is contrary to the idea that relatives of successful politicians
may develop a vocation for public service. Finally, the fact that more political competition
is associated with less dynastic politicians suggests that dynastic transmission may be more
related to advantages such as superior contacts with party machines than to features valued
by voters, such as experience or superior human capital. These ￿ndings lay out a interesting
agenda for future research, namely undertaking a full analysis of the various mechanisms
driving the dynastic transmission of political power.
326 Appendix
6.1 Merging
We merged the biographical dataset and the Candidate and Constituency Statistics of
Elections in the United States, 1788-1990 (ICPSR study 7757) by matching each candi-
date/Congressional term observation in the Biographical Database with the subsequent re-
election attempt from the elections data. For example when Newton Gingrich served in the
96th Congress we would attempt to merge that observation with a reelection attempt to
enter into the 97th Congress. Unfortunately the data from the elections database is not
comprehensive and many elections are missing. Additionally merging between the Congres-
sional Biographical database and the elections database is complicated by the fact that they
only common identi￿ers between both data sets are the year, state, and names of the candi-
dates. After removing elections where there are multiple winners24 and elections where no
names were associated with the candidates25 we are left with 30,028 house elections.26 This
stands in contrast with the 34,271 House member/Congress observations in the Biographical
Database.
To merge the data sets we employed a multi-stage merging procedure. We ￿rst merged on
state/Congressional term/last name and kept all of the merges that were unique. For the re-
maining unmerged observations we then merged on state/Congressional term/last name/￿rst
letter of ￿rst name27 and kept all of the unique merges. Finally we iterated the same process
for state/Congress/last name/￿rst and second letter of the ￿rst name. At this point the
24Historically there have been elections where the top two or more candidates were elected to Congress.
Upon inspection we found that these elections tend to have results that are confusing and do not match with
results from other sources. For the time being we have decided to drop these elections out.
25This makes merging on candidate name quite di¢ cult.
26We have decided to focus on House elections since for our purposes the Senate will not add a substantial
amount of data since Senators were not elected until the beginning of the twentieth century, are much less
in number than House members, and have less frequent election cycles.
27We only merged on the ￿rst letter of the ￿rst name because the ￿rst names in the elections dataset were
often garbled and incomplete.
33merging yield a mere 55 unique matches. After these merges we were able to match 23,016
observations from the elections database and the biographical database. Beyond the fact that
many elections were not recorded, this gap can be substantially attributed to the fact that
many candidates decided not to run for reelection, which would make a merge impossible
since they would not show up in the elections data set. For instance had Newton Gingrich
decided to retire after serving in the 96th Congress no entry would appear in the elections
database. Not surprisingly, the data that failed to merge disproportionately comes from the
earlier years where recording was markedly more sporadic.
To further assess the e¢ cacy of the merge, we merged the data again, but by matching
the Biographical data with the election prior to entry. For example when Newton Gingrich
served in the 96th Congress we would attempt to merge that observation with the election in
1978 to enter into the 96th Congress. Despite the fact that this is not the type of merge that
we use in the paper, it is informative since it will enable us to conduct a diagnostic of whether
there are systematic biases in the sample.28 When conducting the merge in this manner we
were able match 28,560 elections out of the possible 30,028. To analyze whether our sample is
systematically biased we regress the probability that there is a successful merge on a large set
of legislator characteristics as well as ￿xed e⁄ects for each state and decade (i.e. a California
1890 ￿xed e⁄ect). In the unreported analysis we ￿nd suggestive evidence that there is little
systematic bias in the sample, with some notable exceptions. We ￿nd that elections where
women won are 7% less likely to be matched to results. Individuals who go onto to further
civic service are also 1.5% less likely to be matched to election results. However important
variables such as whether an individual has family members in Congress do not appear to
be systematically biased in the sample, conditioning on the state-decade ￿xed e⁄ect. As
28The problem with analyzing the data that was merged as explained above is that characteristics of
politicians (such as gender, age, etc.) would be correlated with the decision to retire from o¢ ce. Thus if we
observed women were much less likely to have a successful merge it would be impossible to determine if that
was due to data being less likely to be recorded or women being less likely to choose to run for re-election.
This problem does not occur in the alternative merging technique.
34mentioned above, while merges are markedly more successful in later years, conditional on
the year we do not see systematic di⁄erences in most of the variables of interest, which
suggests that data omission is essentially random. These merge considerations only apply
to the analysis in Section 4:4 where we use the elections data as an instrument.
6.2 Calculations for subsection 3.3
Because the General Social Survey does not report information on legislators, the row for
legislators in Table 5 follows calculations by the authors that exploit census information
and biographical data on legislators. Our objective was to do the calculation in the most
conservative manner possible, in order to estimate a lower bound for the dynastic prevalence
of legislators. While the information for the other professions comes from the period 1972-
2004, we only considered legislators elected in the 1990s, the last decade of our biographical
sample, which is conservative given that the trends of dynastic prevalence in Congress are
decreasing. The main challenge then lied in estimating how common legislators could have
been (as a proportion of total population) among the generation that spawned the mod-
ern generation of professionals. This requires estimating both the population size of the
generation of fathers, and the number of legislators within that generation. A conservative
calculation would be one that tends to underestimate the heritability of the legislative pro-
fession by overestimating how common legislators were in the generation of fathers. A simple
approach to determine how common legislators are among the fathers in an age cohort is to
see how many legislators belong to a typical class, and then determine the number of fathers
in that class. A conservative calculation should then overestimate the number of legislators
and underestimate the number of fathers. To do this we identi￿ed the class that placed the
highest number of legislators. That is the class of 1840, which placed 94 legislators. We then
estimate the number of fathers in a cohort that could have spawned the legislators of the
1990s, and to err on the side of underestimating that number we take the population size
35of 1900 (earlier than when the 1990s legislators were conceived). In particular, we took the
number of males in fertile ages (20 to 44 years of age) in 1900 (1;993;708 people), and then
took only the percentage of them that would have become fathers. To do this we used the
47% paternity rate reported in the 2002 Survey of Family Growth in the United States. This
is conservative given that paternity rates tend to be lower in modern days. This method
yields that 0:01% of fathers were legislators.
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40Relationship Count Percent Cumulative
Parent 267 16.29 16.29
Child 398 24.28 40.57
Grandparent 45 2.75 43.32
Grandchild 81 4.94 48.26
Uncle / Aunt 101 6.16 54.42
Nephew / Niece 149 9.09 63.51
Brother / Sister 293 17.88 81.39
Cousin 148 9.03 90.42
Husband 34 2.07 92.5
Wife or Widow 32 1.95 94.45
Other 90 5.55 100
Total 1,639 100
Note: Our ICPSR datase does not include all family links among
  legislators but reports a selected link for each. Thus, this table
  is indicative of the major types of family ties present in Congress
  although it cannot be taken to represent the universe of ties.
Table 1: Sample of the major types of family relationshipsVariable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Previous relative in office 11455 0.087 0.28 0 1
Posterior relative in office 11455 0.085 0.28 0 1
Long term 11455 0.651 0.48 0 1
Total tenure 11455 3.73 3.54 1 29
Age at death 10205 69.98 12.78 27 103
Age at entry 11455 43.87 9.25 21 86
Previous public office 11455 0.806 0.40 0 1
College degree 11455 0.651 0.48 0 1
Female 11455 0.015 0.12 0 1
Outsider to state 11455 0.392 0.49 0 1
House (vs. Senate) 11455 0.891 0.31 0 1
Military 11455 0.356 0.48 0 1
Lawyer 10950 0.594 0.49 0 1
Farmer 10950 0.072 0.26 0 1
Note: The age of entry Min is not a mistake. William C.C. Claiborne (1775-1817)
entered Congress without satisfying the constitutional age requirement.








Adams 1803 1862 16 3 John Quincy Adams
Aldrich 1876 Present 32 5 Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich
Breckinridge 1789 1978 72 17 Henry Clay
Bryan 1895 1976 15 3 William Jennings Bryan
Burr 1791 1806 4 2 Aaron Burr
Bush 1951 1970 8 2 George H.W. Bush
Du Pont 1905 1928 9 2 Henry Algernon Du Pont
Frelinghuysen 1793 Present 25 6
Gore 1939 1992 24 2 Albert Arnold Gore Jr.
Harrison 1793 1968 24 8 William Henry Harrison
Hearst 1885 1906 5 2 William Randolph Hearst
Hiester 1789 1880 38 12
Houston 1823 1942 12 3 Samuel Houston
Kennedy 1895 Present 37 6 John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Lodge 1887 1952 37 4 Henry Cabot Lodge
Monroe 1789 1840 4 2 James Monroe
Morris 1789 1802 4 2 Robert Morris
Pelosi 1939 Present 10 2 Nancy Pelosi
Roosevelt 1949 1966 9 2 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr.
Note: Sometimes the family names are not consistent within families. For example Henry 
Clay came from a family where the predominant last name was Breckinridge. For ease of 
exposition we chose the modal last name.
Table 3: Some notable families in CongressTotals South Non-South Difference Senate House Difference Democrats Republicans Difference
Overall .08824 0.11722 0.07386 0.04336 0.13499 0.07674 0.05825 0.08311 0.0733 0.00981
[.00371] [.00744] [.00412] [.00851]*** [.01052] [.0035] [.0107]*** [.00611] [.00595] [.00852]
1788-1859 0.12065 0.14581 0.10309 0.04272 0.12678 0.119 0.00778
[.0075] [.01395] [.00812] [.01614]*** [.01699] [.00763] [.01742]
1860-1865 0.10128 0.07407 0.10565 -0.03158 0.14595 0.0874 0.05855
[.01436] [.03541] [.01567] [.03871] [.03671] [.0874] [.03961]
1866-1879 0.10675 0.13334 0.09422 0.03911 0.20096 0.08081 0.12015 0.15254 0.06905 0.08349
[.00105] [.02] [.01227] [.02346]* [.03178] [.00946] [.0327]*** [.01881] [.01177] [.02219]***
1880-1939 0.089 0.13496 0.06773 0.06723 0.15945 0.0722 0.08725 0.09415 0.08355 0.0106
[.00619] [.01367] [.06723] [.01509]*** [.01868] [.00565] [.01889]*** [.00913] [.00846] [.0106]
1940-1965 0.0673 0.08315 0.0602 0.023 0.09532 0.06048 0.03584 0.06311 0.07285 -0.00974
[.00753] [.01537] [.00846] [.02295] [.02075] [.00766] [.02175]* [.00957] [.07285] [.01544]
1966-1996 0.06178 0.06917 0.0584 0.01076 0.10564 0.0517 0.05394 0.06577 0.05402 0.01175
[.00751] [.0126] [.00932] [.01567] [.02335] [.00725] [.02418]** [.01046] [.0103] [.01175]
Standard errors clustered at the legislator level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Totals South Non-South Difference Senate House Difference Democrats Republicans Difference
Overall 0.08677 0.11805 0.07316 0.04489 0.12998 0.08146 0.04852 0.08055 0.06934 0.01121
[.00263] [.00548] [.00291] [.00571]*** [.0095] [.00271] [.00841]*** [.00443] [.00424] [.00614]*
1788-1859 0.1098 0.13766 0.095 0.04266 0.12834 0.10768 0.02066
[.00518] [.00969] [.00601] [.01086]*** [.01732] [.00542] [.01707]
1860-1865 0.09384 0.04167 0.10239 -0.06072 0.21951 0.07667 0.14284
[.01581] [.02915] [.01774] [.04542] [.06545] [.01539] [.04808]***
1866-1879 0.08588 0.10837 0.07403 0.03435 0.2 0.0717 0.1283 0.1173 0.05919 0.05811
[.00817] [.01544] [.00944] [.01717]** [.03522] [.00798] [.02561]*** [.01436] [.00932] [.01436]***
1880-1939 0.08025 0.12382 0.06396 0.05986 0.13044 0.07427 0.05617 0.07893 0.08251 -0.00358
[.00436] [.01013] [.0046] [.00974]*** [.01657] [.00445] [.0141]*** [.00605] [.00643] [.00882]
1940-1965 0.06726 0.1051 0.05435 0.05075 0.08523 0.06427 0.02096 0.07456 0.05667 0.01789
[.00713] [.01733] [.00748] [.01632]*** [.02111] [.00713] [.0204] [.01005] [.0099] [.01431]
1966-1996 0.05627 0.06789 0.05063 0.01725 0.09244 0.05218 0.04025 0.06187 0.0507 0.01117
[.00673] [.01287] [.00781] [.01435] [.02666] [.00685] [.02228]* [.00986] [.00918] [.0135]
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Party differences shown after 1866 once the modern two party system emerged.
Table 4: Sample means of proportion of legislators with previous relatives
Flows: Proportion of freshman legislators with previous relatives. Each legislator is only counted in congress of entry
Stocks: Proportion of legislators with previous relatives. Each legislator is counted in every congress he/she is in office(1) (2) (3)
% with father % of fathers Dynastic bias
Occupation in same occupation in each occupation
Federal Public Admin. 6.53% 1.48% 4.41
Carpenter 12.21% 2.23% 5.48
Electrician 8.71% 0.88% 9.96
Dentist 2.27% 0.16% 14.28
Plumber 10.53% 0.70% 14.97
Doctor 12.31% 0.48% 25.55
Economist 1.33% 0.04% 34.45
Legislator 2.56% 0.01% 255.60
Note: (3) = (1)/(2).
         The methodology for computing the legislator figures is explained in the 
           appendix and was designed to provide a lower bound on the dynastic bias
           ratio for legislators.
         The data for non political occupations comes from the General Social Surveys 
           (ICPSR study 4295). 
Table 5: Dynastic bias across occupations(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
House House Age of entry Age of entry Pre. public off. Pre. public off. College degree College degree Outsider Outsider Female Female
Previous Relative -0.07503 -0.0764 -0.50866 -0.34821 -0.05641 -0.05611 0.14033 0.12945 -0.03102 -0.02571 0.02492 0.02566
[0.01842]*** [0.01780]*** [0.35166] [0.29524] [0.01849]*** [0.01734]*** [0.01805]*** [0.01718]*** [0.02218] [0.02038] [0.00795]*** [0.00771]***
House -4.98911 -0.00657 -0.05303 -0.02909 0.00884
[0.32099]*** [0.01575] [0.01784]*** [0.01412]** [0.00438]**
Age of entry -0.00619 0.00559 -0.00762 0.00543 0.00071
[0.00078]*** [0.00058]*** [0.00047]*** [0.00080]*** [0.00019]***
Pre. public office -0.00351 2.40951 0.00453 -0.0788 -0.00191
[0.00819] [0.26049]*** [0.01136] [0.01192]*** [0.00421]
College degree -0.02606 -3.01501 0.00417 -0.08569 0.00314
[0.00757]*** [0.17918]*** [0.01042] [0.01593]*** [0.00207]
Outsider -0.01264 1.90007 -0.06401 -0.07575 0.0085
[0.00594]** [0.27805]*** [0.01059]*** [0.01417]*** [0.00385]**
Female 0.05167 3.33733 -0.02092 0.03731 0.11441
[0.02664]* [0.76922]*** [0.04658] [0.02341] [0.04944]**
Constant 1.05567 1.25058 27.32269 34.84151 -0.03379 -0.16729 0.8865 1.16926 0.24887 0.20351 0.0088 -0.02484
[0.00278]*** [0.02223]*** [0.06347]*** [0.40889]*** [0.00401]*** [0.02506]*** [0.00311]*** [0.02570]*** [0.00431]*** [0.02953]*** [0.00094]*** [0.00846]***
Year YYYYYYYYYYYY
State YYYYYYYYYYYY
Observations 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765
R-squared 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.09 0.09
Sample: Individuals who did not follow a relative's death to avoid contamination with cases where a relative enters Congress to complete the term of a deceased legislator.
To avoid censoring, we exclude individuals born after 1800.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: The effect of previous relatives on personal characteristics(1) (2) (3) (4)
longterm longterm totaltenure totaltenure
Previous Relative 0.00995 0.02084 0.0706 -0.04164
[0.01974] [0.02001] [0.14075] [0.13742]
House 0.2181 -1.03206
[0.02055]*** [0.14718]***
Age of entry -0.00663 -0.08639
[0.00058]*** [0.00657]***
Pre. public office 0.05972 0.52768
[0.01084]*** [0.08598]***






Constant 0.92853 0.85211 2.53806 5.88934
[0.00358]*** [0.03266]*** [0.02882]*** [0.23957]***
Year YYYY
State YYYY
Observations 8765 8765 8765 8765
R-squared 0.1 0.14 0.17 0.22
Sample: Individuals who did not follow a relative's death and born after 1800.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7: The effect of previous relatives on tenure length(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political Competition 0.1303 .1451
[.086] [.0877]
Political Competition ^ 2 .4217 .4448
[.1770]** [.1810]**
High political competition dummy -0.0188 -.01799
[.00997]* [.0103]*
Constant 0.0408 0.0980 0.0487 0.1046
[0.0286] [0.0583]* [0.299] [0.619]*
Year Effects YYYY
State Effects YYYY
Joint significance (F test statistic) 4.10** 3.92**
Excluding first 30 years of statehood N Y N Y
Observations 6395 6150 6395 6150
R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Sample: Excludes individuals who entered Congress before 1879 due to lack of political competition
  data for earlier years.
The political competition index ranges from -0.5 (all seats in the state legislature held by one 
  party, or least competitive) to 0 (seats held evenly by the two major parties, or most competitive).
The High competition dummy takes the value 1 whenever the political competition index is higher than 
  the mid point -0.25.
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
   *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Prerelative
Table 8: Political competition and dynastic legislatorsDependent Variable: Postrelatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Longterm 0.02144 0.01835 0.02667 0.02901 0.02892 0.02641
[0.00491]*** [0.00409]*** [0.00459]*** [0.00431]*** [0.00454]*** [0.00412]***
Constant 0.07125 0.06598 0.07174 0.3839 0.26344 0.3034

















Senate only 0.05005 0.04142
[0.01182]*** [0.01083]***
House to Senate 0.06844 0.06355
[0.02305]*** [0.02334]***
Senate to House 0.0877 0.06946
[0.06448] [0.06254]
Age at entry & death  NNNNYY
Year and State Effects N N N Y Y Y
Died in office excluded N YYYYY
Born before 1910 N N YYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
YYYYYN
Observations 11455 10379 8812 8812 8490 7740
R-squared 0 0 0 0.09 0.13 0.09
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. Age at entry and death controls are dummies
  for the decade of age (e.g., 40s, 50s, etc.) at which the legislator entered Congress/died.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9: Tenure length and Postrelatives(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total tenure 0.0041 0.00231 0.00439 0.00763 0.00561 0.00392 0.0081 0.00714 0.01368 0.01561 0.01314 0.01155
[0.00084]*** [0.00074]*** [0.00101]*** [0.00105]*** [0.00095]*** [0.00095]*** [0.00195]*** [0.00173]*** [0.00225]*** [0.00183]*** [0.00195]*** [0.00203]***
Total tenure^2 -0.00027 -0.00034 -0.00066 -0.00056 -0.00052 -0.00053
[0.00014]* [0.00011]*** [0.00013]*** [0.00010]*** [0.00010]*** [0.00012]***
Constant 0.06993 0.06958 0.07399 0.37914 0.26159 0.30048 0.06226 0.06066 0.05737 0.36147 0.25416 0.29287
[0.00765]*** [0.00732]*** [0.00817]*** [0.05160]*** [0.08609]*** [0.08402]*** [0.00755]*** [0.00631]*** [0.00668]*** [0.05136]*** [0.08527]*** [0.08305]***
Prerelative 0.16876 0.16857
[0.02575]*** [0.02564]***
Female -0.04936 0.02947 -0.04755 0.02861
[0.02473]* [0.04159] [0.02443]* [0.04117]
College degree 0.01269 0.00866 0.01205 0.00802
[0.00877] [0.00840] [0.00870] [0.00833]
Outsider -0.00013 -0.00333 -0.00033 -0.00351
[0.00830] [0.00819] [0.00823] [0.00812]
Previous public office -0.00181 -0.00224 -0.00219 -0.00264
[0.00764] [0.00750] [0.00769] [0.00756]
Military 0.01481 0.00979 0.01488 0.0098
[0.00691]** [0.00596] [0.00688]** [0.00590]
Lawyer 0.00004 0.00157 -0.0003 0.00123
[0.00590] [0.00716] [0.00587] [0.00712]
Farmer 0.01047 0.00296 0.01058 0.00296
[0.00999] [0.01006] [0.01004] [0.01007]
Senate only 0.03655 0.03032 0.0337 0.02735
[0.01136]*** [0.01026]*** [0.01115]*** [0.00986]***
House to Senate 0.04998 0.05314 0.0485 0.05081
[0.02342]** [0.02352]** [0.02341]** [0.02350]**
Senate to House 0.08485 0.07051 0.0796 0.06415
[0.06249] [0.06160] [0.06355] [0.06245]
Age at entry & death  NNNNYYNNNNYY
Year and State Effects N N N Y Y Y N N N Y YY
Died in office excluded N YYYYYNYYYYY
Born before 1910 N N YYYYNNYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
YYYYYNYYYYYN
Observations 11455 10379 8812 8812 8490 7740 11455 10379 8812 8812 8490 7740
R-squared 0 0 0 0.09 0.13 0.09 0 0 0 0.09 0.13 0.09
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. Age at entry & death dummies as in Table 9. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10: Tenure length and Postrelatives
Dependent Variable: Postrelatives2.5% margin of vote window 5% margin of vote window
Win Lose Difference Win Lose Difference
Posterior relative in office 0.071 0.028 0.043 0.067 0.031 0.035
[.016] [.01] [.019]** [.01] [.008] [.013]**
Year 1885.48 1887.00 -2.41 1885.01 1888.88 -3.87
[2.04] [2.14] [2.96] [1.42] [1.65] [2.16]*
Age at entry 43.88 44.68 -0.8 43.82 44.72 -0.90
[.55] [.6] [.81] [.37] [.44] [.57]
Age at death 71.18 71.00 0.18 71.51 70.90 0.61
[.75] [.78] [1.08] [.48] [.57] [.74]
Female 0.007 0.008 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001
[.005] [.006] [.008] [.003] [.003] [.004]
College degree 0.607 0.633 -0.027 0.600 0.606 -0.006
[.03] [.03] [.043] [.02] [.022] [.03]
Outsider to state 0.449 0.422 0.027 0.422 0.436 -0.014
[.03] [.031] [.044] [.02] [.023] [.031]
Previous public office 0.783 0.869 -0.086 0.803 0.826 -0.023
[.025] [.021] [.033]** [.016] [.017] [.024]
Military 0.300 0.295 0.005 0.316 0.281 0.035
[.028] [.029] [.04] [.019] [.021] [.028]
Lawyer 0.663 0.596 0.067 0.611 0.567 0.044
[.029] [.031] [.043] [.02] [.023] [.031]
Farmer 0.042 0.065 -0.023 0.062 0.062 0.000
[.012] [.016] [.02] [.01] [.011] [.015]
Business 0.272 0.318 -0.046 0.292 0.329 -0.037
[.028] [.03] [.041] [.019] [.022] [.027]
Observations 251 267 477 588
Sample: Individuals with no pre-relatives, who did not die in office and, to avoid censoring, born before 1910.
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 11: Characteristics of close winners versus close losers in first re-election attempt(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 5% 5% 5%
Win 0.85671 0.54542 0.48855 0.90842 0.56498 0.53381
[0.08332]*** [0.36102] [0.34155] [0.05078]*** [0.16343]*** [0.15742]***
Female*(1-Win) -0.28485 -0.30062 -0.25325 -0.25486
[0.16346]* [0.16208]* [0.12338]** [0.12287]**
College degree*(1-Win) 0.02928 0.02143 0.04147 0.03663
[0.06800] [0.06610] [0.04448] [0.04367]
Outsider*(1-Win) -0.0457 -0.05481 0.03192 0.01537
[0.06241] [0.05523] [0.04400] [0.04465]
Previous public office*(1-Win) 0.0271 0.00535 -0.00656 -0.02861
[0.09011] [0.09849] [0.06727] [0.06795]
Age at entry*(1-Win) -0.00736 -0.00659 -0.00755 -0.00708
[0.00351]** [0.00345]* [0.00288]** [0.00278]**
Age at death*(1-Win) 0.00001 0.00051 0.00033 0.00054
[0.00247] [0.00237] [0.00134] [0.00122]
Military*(1-Win) -0.02747 -0.04003 -0.00022 -0.01112
[0.06738] [0.06389] [0.04710] [0.04447]
Farmer*(1-Win) 0.06941 0.08244 -0.07103 -0.06207
[0.32986] [0.32392] [0.13973] [0.13991]
Lawyer*(1-Win) -0.04137 -0.03353 -0.0623 -0.05129
[0.27508] [0.26778] [0.09118] [0.09285]
Business*(1-Win) 0.01067 -0.01011 -0.05102 -0.04707
[0.29249] [0.28394] [0.10052] [0.10104]
Prerelative*(1-Win) -0.16462 -0.13851
[0.10055] [0.08176]*
Constant 0.14329 0.45458 0.51145 0.09158 0.43502 0.46619
[0.08332]* [0.36102] [0.34155] [0.05078]* [0.16343]** [0.15742]***
Region  YYYYYY
Decade YYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNY
Observations 518 506 551 1065 1047 1127
R-squared 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69
F statistic 171.72 332.5 69.61 2996.79 5397.38 6170.15
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
Table 12: IV-RD First stage
Dependent Variable: Longterm(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5% 5% 5%
Longterm 0.04866 0.05235 0.04645 0.04214 0.04024 0.03086
[0.02120]** [0.02297]** [0.02484]* [0.01220]*** [0.01252]*** [0.01781]*
Female 0.02772 -0.0514 0.0181 -0.03367
[0.04288] [0.07404] [0.02115] [0.04819]
College degree 0.0608 0.04973 0.03954 0.03352
[0.01870]*** [0.01763]*** [0.01450]*** [0.01390]**
Outsider 0.01845 0.01741 -0.00996 -0.01255
[0.02417] [0.02396] [0.01694] [0.01533]
Previous public office 0.01996 0.00238 -0.01095 -0.01046
[0.01986] [0.02126] [0.01936] [0.02055]
Age at entry -0.00089 -0.00074 -0.00053 -0.0006
[0.00130] [0.00122] [0.00088] [0.00090]
Age at death 0.0003 0.00029 0.00013 -0.00015
[0.00103] [0.00100] [0.00069] [0.00077]
Military 0.00157 -0.016 0.01881 0.00958
[0.02297] [0.02584] [0.01594] [0.01508]
Farmer 0.02417 0.04953 -0.01533 -0.0154
[0.04588] [0.04894] [0.03819] [0.03894]
Lawyer 0.0687 0.0725 0.00206 0.00124
[0.03875]* [0.03831]* [0.02962] [0.03051]
Business 0.10496 0.10257 0.01457 0.00613
[0.04554]** [0.04499]** [0.02894] [0.03034]
Prerelative 0.13129 0.16203
[0.07202]* [0.05041]***
Constant 0.0072 -0.11938 -0.08128 0.00228 -0.00489 0.04613
[0.04453] [0.05730]** [0.07374] [0.02385] [0.05694] [0.06501]
Region  YYYYYY
Decade YYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNY
Observations 518 506 551 1065 1047 1127
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 13: IV-RD Second stage



















Win 0.91952 2.46301 2.09578 13.5333 2.14543 14.57344 1.55957 8.60396 0.88745 -8.7073 0.99698 -5.46495
[0.37192]** [3.29757] [1.56576] [16.14467] [1.39629] [15.28721] [0.51354]*** [8.12704] [1.39486] [20.07919] [1.39669] [19.94512]
Female*(1-Win) -0.85346 -2.47058 -0.18697 -0.26698 0.25157 18.29888 0.65911 17.69107
[1.63394] [18.17377] [1.17766] [14.40721] [1.04577] [15.19806] [0.65042] [9.97511]*
College degree*(1-Win) -0.62977 -6.17468 -0.62398 -6.04478 -0.36366 -5.81533 -0.3064 -4.85652
[0.37345]* [3.97209] [0.35523]* [3.72070] [0.22388] [3.05807]* [0.21969] [2.93595]
Outsider*(1-Win) 0.19076 3.98504 0.11378 2.75672 0.45536 5.24759 0.38827 4.5581
[0.47036] [4.76448] [0.42911] [4.33027] [0.36312] [4.61614] [0.32137] [4.05981]
Previous public office*(1-Win) -0.15446 -3.50687 -0.1689 -3.53089 -0.22921 -3.546 -0.33236 -4.56012
[0.63461] [9.48908] [0.59487] [8.66078] [0.52572] [7.27936] [0.47787] [6.60084]
Age at entry*(1-Win) -0.01071 -0.23684 -0.0079 -0.21231 0.00047 0.10852 0.00072 0.09938
[0.04168] [0.49932] [0.03870] [0.46495] [0.02773] [0.42919] [0.02567] [0.40092]
Age at death*(1-Win) 0.00748 0.16224 0.0062 0.14196 -0.00734 -0.22054 -0.00529 -0.17494
[0.01841] [0.24962] [0.01741] [0.22882] [0.01603] [0.29628] [0.01363] [0.25666]
Military*(1-Win) -0.38675 -8.44015 -0.30961 -7.00552 -0.36919 -4.93085 -0.40479 -5.44864
[0.39069] [5.23155] [0.37282] [4.82890] [0.34357] [4.35722] [0.32930] [4.16933]
Farmer*(1-Win) 2.31832 22.46085 2.11063 20.72462 -0.13025 -8.97806 -0.0139 -7.1373
[1.76125] [20.39928] [1.70489] [19.71728] [0.93313] [13.77190] [0.90811] [13.58363]
Lawyer*(1-Win) 1.94874 20.92147 2.05275 22.11254 0.28962 0.50258 0.32886 1.25326
[1.37282] [16.65534] [1.35515] [16.25085] [0.80417] [12.78674] [0.82947] [13.02907]
Business*(1-Win) 1.68579 19.4187 1.73311 20.06529 0.3067 2.09792 0.39328 3.33354
[1.38873] [15.50333] [1.38288] [15.43970] [0.83700] [11.89180] [0.85748] [12.09588]
Prerelative*(1-Win) 0.35082 3.75454 0.43939 6.88265
[0.38440] [4.41980] [0.39856] [4.49652]
Female -0.8899 -17.1264 -1.53744 -18.8361 -1.62782 -32.48608 -1.97315 -31.0128
[1.26464] [13.67318] [0.63574]** [7.94717]** [0.86762]* [13.61543]** [0.48382]*** [8.66274]***
College degree 0.72488 6.83562 0.70863 6.75522 0.4128 5.08273 0.37316 4.50663
[0.20222]*** [1.81987]*** [0.20445]*** [1.88637]*** [0.17086]** [2.44652]** [0.16308]** [2.25009]*
Outsider 0.04178 -0.91903 0.06283 -0.40667 -0.09626 -1.03868 -0.12783 -1.41325
[0.30117] [2.75092] [0.27336] [2.50683] [0.19387] [2.51324] [0.17940] [2.27444]
5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5%
Table 14: IV-RD First stage



















Previous public office 0.32412 1.85593 0.31081 2.13175 0.4166 5.59844 0.40282 5.50927
[0.24994] [3.17701] [0.22773] [2.88226] [0.23680]* [3.73079] [0.21001]* [3.31148]
Age at entry -0.04134 -0.40763 -0.04045 -0.39362 -0.07056 -0.97713 -0.06659 -0.91794
[0.02665] [0.30756] [0.02473] [0.28638] [0.01542]*** [0.29048]*** [0.01410]*** [0.26915]***
Age at death 0.02064 0.25298 0.02022 0.24051 0.03914 0.66051 0.03602 0.59596
[0.00998]** [0.11881]** [0.00964]** [0.11478]** [0.01162]*** [0.25427]** [0.01032]*** [0.22442]**
Military 0.18733 4.06673 0.11984 3.06974 0.32076 4.19063 0.33917 4.68407
[0.24334] [3.07953] [0.23488] [2.88691] [0.24411] [3.29040] [0.23506] [3.12650]
Farmer -2.09107 -21.57529 -1.83526 -19.51768 -0.25056 3.26882 -0.28007 2.37507
[1.63213] [20.35181] [1.62287] [20.05031] [0.75909] [12.46443] [0.72241] [12.15183]
Lawyer -1.91417 -19.80559 -1.9923 -20.76657 -0.52406 -2.6361 -0.52518 -3.08716
[1.27856] [16.81483] [1.29756] [16.75531] [0.71841] [12.29849] [0.72058] [12.26489]
Business -1.64618 -18.55955 -1.70171 -19.05244 -0.63366 -6.31587 -0.63442 -6.52715
[1.25950] [16.06092] [1.27524] [16.04406] [0.64879] [10.81173] [0.64749] [10.78996]
Prerelative -1.04683 -9.99006 -0.83141 -9.74565
[0.25083]*** [2.55438]*** [0.24496]*** [3.53353]***
Constant 1.3957 4.20446 1.4961 4.59122 1.59236 5.02575 1.44662 7.31738 2.3512 16.20704 2.30761 15.10713
[0.31205]*** [3.15680] [1.05083] [9.03070] [1.00779] [8.96907] [0.37006]*** [5.53817] [0.80260]*** [10.17198] [0.77121]*** [9.75853]
Region  YYYYYYYYYYYY
Decade YYYYYYYYYYYY
Includes Members with Previous 
Relatives 
NNNNYYNNNNYY
Observations 518 518 506 506 551 551 1065 1065 1047 1047 1127 1127
R-squared 0.23 0.13 0.31 0.23 0.3 0.22 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.14
F statistic 50.59 22.54 63.1 69.11 87.52 82.23 81.45 63.19 107.92 41.79 148.86 23.93
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
5% 5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5%
Table 14 Continued: IV-RD First Stage(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 5% 5% 5%
Total tenure 0.04389 0.04008 0.04649 0.06265 0.03874 0.04362
[0.02056]** [0.01670]** [0.01724]*** [0.02024]*** [0.01634]** [0.02629]
Total tenure^2 -0.00412 -0.00317 -0.00457 -0.00677 -0.00363 -0.0049
[0.00301] [0.00183]* [0.00199]** [0.00281]** [0.00207]* [0.00346]
Female 0.02296 -0.07036 -0.00584 -0.07419
[0.04431] [0.08466] [0.03148] [0.06235]
College degree 0.05733 0.04972 0.03995 0.03586
[0.01884]*** [0.01838]*** [0.01574]** [0.01550]**
Outsider 0.01515 0.01417 -0.00893 -0.0113
[0.02406] [0.02365] [0.01731] [0.01549]
Previous public office 0.01238 -0.00395 -0.0081 -0.00387
[0.01938] [0.02151] [0.01974] [0.02074]
Age at entry -0.00091 -0.00115 -0.00134 -0.00214
[0.00137] [0.00135] [0.00111] [0.00137]
Age at death 0.0004 0.00067 0.00079 0.00094
[0.00109] [0.00102] [0.00074] [0.00089]
Military 0.00023 -0.01702 0.02081 0.01502
[0.02132] [0.02411] [0.01631] [0.01629]
Farmer 0.02856 0.04378 -0.00764 -0.00691
[0.04984] [0.05355] [0.03467] [0.03568]
Lawyer 0.07741 0.07252 0.00728 0.0049
[0.04232]* [0.04210]* [0.03106] [0.03544]
Business 0.11033 0.10067 0.01313 0.00111
[0.04282]** [0.04473]** [0.02985] [0.03441]
Prerelative 0.12829 0.1552
[0.07201]* [0.04828]***
Constant -0.02254 -0.14825 -0.11686 -0.03573 -0.04263 0.00393
[0.04935] [0.06506]** [0.08224] [0.03402] [0.05987] [0.07102]
Region  YYYYYY
Decade YYYYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNY
TE(2-1) 0.03153 0.03057 0.03278 0.04234 0.02785 0.02892
TE(2-1) p-value 0.0196 0.0166 0.0136 0.0014 0.0117 0.0844
Observations 518 506 551 1065 1047 1127
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets
TE(2-1): marginal impact on Postrelative of a total tenure of two terms versus one term 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
Table 15: IV-RD Second stage
Dependent Variable: Postrelative(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
25% 25% 25% 25% 40% 40%
Win 0.79903 0.61653 0.61233 0.61633 0.81931 0.63553
[0.05702]*** [0.12186]*** [0.11532]*** [0.11800]*** [0.04735]***[0.11639]***
Female*(1-Win) -0.02087 -0.01643 0.02805 -0.02881
[0.15393] [0.15376] [0.15530] [0.15354]
College degree*(1-Win) 0.04484 0.04312 0.02182 0.04749
[0.02479]* [0.02435]* [0.03032] [0.02213]**
Outsider*(1-Win) 0.0039 -0.00692 0.01159 -0.00573
[0.02535] [0.02501] [0.03176] [0.02557]
Previous public office*(1-Win) -0.00114 -0.01717 -0.02243 0.0019
[0.03426] [0.03270] [0.03318] [0.03380]
Age at entry*(1-Win) -0.007 -0.00619 -0.00652 -0.00673
[0.00188]*** [0.00184]*** [0.00184]*** [0.00178]***
Age at death*(1-Win) 0.00181 0.00168 0.00211 0.00187
[0.00108] [0.00102] [0.00099]** [0.00113]
Military*(1-Win) -0.01028 -0.01155 -0.02141 -0.01219
[0.02851] [0.02789] [0.02620] [0.02569]
Farmer*(1-Win) -0.02759 -0.00965 -0.04892 -0.05809
[0.07866] [0.07747] [0.08458] [0.07530]
Lawyer*(1-Win) -0.03565 -0.03083 -0.04182 -0.05588
[0.05404] [0.05226] [0.04743] [0.05357]
Business*(1-Win) -0.00991 -0.0082 -0.01791 -0.01894
[0.06924] [0.06660] [0.06536] [0.07036]
Prerelative*(1-Win) -0.06206
[0.04538]
Constant 0.20097 0.38347 0.38767 0.38367 0.18069 0.36447
[0.05702]*** [0.12186]*** [0.11532]*** [0.11800]*** [0.04735]***[0.11639]***
Region Y Y Y N Y Y
Decade Y Y Y N Y Y
Margin of votes quartic Y Y Y Y Y Y
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
NNYNNN
State N N N Y N N
Year N N N Y N N
Observations 3095 3034 3295 3034 3605 3537
R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.78
F statistic 2134.44 9427.11 17234.85 11678.95 2790 10522.46
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
Table 16: IV First stage - large windows
Dependent Variable: LongtermDependent Variable: Postrelative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 40% 40%
Longterm 0.06428 0.06244 0.05028 0.05425 0.04669 0.05154 0.04661
[0.02092]*** [0.02144]*** [0.02590]* [0.02378]** [0.01572]*** [0.02179]** [0.02025]**
Female 0.05354 0.0244 0.02568 0.04652 0.04601
[0.06678] [0.06347] [0.06390] [0.06903] [0.05927]
College degree 0.01261 0.01251 0.01247 0.00974 0.01086
[0.00895] [0.01013] [0.01008] [0.00862] [0.00862]
Outsider -0.00002 -0.00051 -0.00054 0.00284 0.00104
[0.00776] [0.00823] [0.00824] [0.00698] [0.00649]
Previous public office 0.00405 0.00513 0.00509 -0.00139 0.00002
[0.00798] [0.00838] [0.00837] [0.00868] [0.00826]
Age at entry 0.00035 0.00017 0.00016 0.00035 0.0001
[0.00044] [0.00048] [0.00049] [0.00046] [0.00038]
Age at death -0.00007 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00026
[0.00039] [0.00042] [0.00042] [0.00035] [0.00037]
Military 0.00124 -0.00874 -0.00891 -0.00129 -0.00028
[0.00914] [0.00942] [0.00939] [0.00864] [0.00806]
Farmer -0.01667 -0.01936 -0.01872 -0.01809 -0.01933
[0.02462] [0.02303] [0.02313] [0.02549] [0.02122]
Lawyer 0.00569 0.00172 0.0015 0.00915 0.00683
[0.01686] [0.01711] [0.01722] [0.01649] [0.01386]
Business 0.00656 -0.00028 -0.00025 0.00964 0.00809





Constant 0.00378 -0.02199 -0.00047 -0.00301 -0.05288 0.01557 0.02078
[0.01795] [0.03033] [0.04052] [0.04026] [0.03321] [0.01973] [0.03417]
Region  YYYYNYY
Decade YYYYNYY
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYYY





Observations 3095 3034 3295 3295 3034 3605 3537
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%



















Win 1.12002 3.33391 1.04425 -2.88729 1.19229 0.0549 0.51033 -8.20437 0.94211 -0.88898 0.4789 -10.64449
[0.30023]*** [3.18625] [1.06768] [15.42783] [1.00530] [14.53174] [1.27449] [18.03092] [0.32513]*** [4.58743] [0.90433] [12.12421]
Female*(1-Win) 0.92848 19.5052 1.40967 22.91289 -0.91441 -8.47021 0.66582 13.88848
[0.75933] [10.14804]* [0.69656]** [8.42555]*** [1.04060] [14.02170] [0.71404] [9.28755]
College degree*(1-Win) 0.10332 0.21104 0.13719 1.03087 -0.55806 -7.90334 0.04939 -0.23922
[0.13182] [1.94227] [0.12502] [1.93594] [0.18957]*** [2.68442]*** [0.10712] [1.55552]
Outsider*(1-Win) 0.04393 1.19729 0.00174 0.71249 0.12279 1.66126 -0.09507 -0.75447
[0.19837] [2.99195] [0.18422] [2.80373] [0.18463] [2.39974] [0.19408] [2.73228]
Previous public office*(1-Win) -0.35738 -5.45879 -0.4624 -6.42205 -0.46656 -6.46503 -0.32983 -4.77777
[0.23893] [3.26835] [0.22754]** [3.03956]** [0.23406]* [3.05024]** [0.23424] [3.07280]
Age at entry*(1-Win) 0.03657 0.79053 0.04194 0.85544 0.01781 0.56789 0.04507 0.91587
[0.01281]*** [0.21829]*** [0.01220]*** [0.21590]*** [0.01266] [0.21160]*** [0.01188]*** [0.20507]***
Age at death*(1-Win) -0.03231 -0.68966 -0.03136 -0.66385 -0.04145 -0.81812 -0.0396 -0.77991
[0.00865]*** [0.14965]*** [0.00828]*** [0.14680]*** [0.00912]*** [0.15976]*** [0.00789]*** [0.13937]***
Military*(1-Win) -0.0896 -1.38218 -0.0914 -1.15266 -0.19128 -2.21984 -0.03411 -0.62992
[0.18837] [3.27875] [0.18125] [3.12115] [0.21971] [3.36035] [0.17054] [2.91888]
Farmer*(1-Win) 1.28372 17.01584 1.39736 17.68231 1.78375 24.15491 1.19345 16.76935
[0.58780]** [9.83604]* [0.55086]** [9.33838]* [0.64861]*** [10.51682]** [0.57410]** [9.08138]*
Lawyer*(1-Win) 0.7956 11.4737 0.86948 11.9149 1.64754 22.87222 0.60765 9.54785
[0.47761] [9.00211] [0.46468]* [8.73447] [0.53926]*** [9.81558]** [0.48160] [8.23452]
Business*(1-Win) 0.84773 11.12923 0.95854 12.43353 1.47012 19.28411 0.70488 9.88851
[0.48871]* [9.13164] [0.47324]** [8.83351] [0.54948]** [9.76624]* [0.49519] [8.24582]
Prerelative*(1-Win) -0.09516 -0.77686
[0.30175] [4.52873]
Female -1.35529 -24.40739 -1.80573 -27.51341 -0.01088 -7.05415 -1.1617 -19.50442
[0.69797]* [9.97567]** [0.59275]*** [8.25808]*** [0.90207] [11.28379] [0.67219]* [9.21990]**
College degree 0.05566 0.86696 0.03237 0.18584 0.6019 7.78092 0.14139 1.61836
[0.11182] [1.86618] [0.10772] [1.88530] [0.13589]*** [2.29553]*** [0.09850] [1.57842]
Outsider -0.01284 -0.92412 -0.01586 -0.84388 -0.1612 -2.48309 0.11924 1.12285
[0.12755] [2.44334] [0.12365] [2.31839] [0.12134] [1.97521] [0.12057] [2.16540]
40% 40% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Table 18: IV-RD First stage - large windows



















Previous public office 0.46234 6.82349 0.4998 7.30712 0.40571 5.84932 0.42784 6.04679
[0.11253]*** [1.50055]*** [0.10854]*** [1.43852]*** [0.14264]*** [1.78927]*** [0.11459]*** [1.63251]***
Age at entry -0.0825 -1.33253 -0.08388 -1.35478 -0.0628 -1.09115 -0.08828 -1.42257
[0.00805]*** [0.16998]*** [0.00829]*** [0.17506]*** [0.00798]*** [0.16226]*** [0.00753]*** [0.15876]***
Age at death 0.05473 0.97525 0.05229 0.93218 0.0665 1.12853 0.06036 1.04288
[0.00793]*** [0.15184]*** [0.00785]*** [0.15047]*** [0.00825]*** [0.16129]*** [0.00701]*** [0.13977]***
Military 0.07414 1.61234 0.06902 1.30025 0.16762 2.88342 0.04199 1.144
[0.11777] [2.52643] [0.11365] [2.35266] [0.13830] [2.30482] [0.09730] [2.13886]
Farmer -1.18179 -16.2942 -1.23419 -16.57487 -1.72143 -23.70934 -1.21722 -16.93752
[0.46817]** [8.94043]* [0.44454]*** [8.54781]* [0.48422]*** [9.12760]** [0.42558]*** [8.00515]**
Lawyer -0.75476 -10.48146 -0.82566 -10.96774 -1.56607 -21.25185 -0.68838 -9.65186
[0.41298]* [8.39051] [0.40086]** [8.11800] [0.45133]*** [8.83872]** [0.36447]* [7.35326]
Business -0.68735 -9.06667 -0.77162 -10.08823 -1.27576 -16.94754 -0.66748 -9.07383
[0.41163] [8.38764] [0.39750]* [8.09490] [0.43788]*** [8.84076]* [0.36932]* [7.21795]
Prerelative -0.11535 -1.15917
[0.21605] [3.99911]
Constant 1.5023 5.1262 1.76935 6.85696 1.72701 6.1971 1.73492 4.9365 1.51652 6.4568 1.87354 8.99958
[0.23154]*** [2.35501]** [0.45416]*** [4.84678] [0.40923]*** [4.43035] [0.65027]** [7.69299] [0.23795]*** [2.91926]** [0.46880]*** [4.80306]*
Region Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Decade Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Margin of Votes quartic Y Y Y Y Y Y YYYYYY





Observations 3095 3095 3034 3034 3295 3295 3034 3034 3605 3605 3537 3537
R-squared 0.24 0.11 0.3 0.17 0.3 0.17 0.27 0.15 0.26 0.12 0.33 0.19
F statistic 26.66 13.57 37.6 24.99 49.04 25.3 250000 11571.8 37.51 34.66 54.55 42.93
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
40% 40% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Table 18 Continued: IV-RD First Stage - large windowsDependent Variable: Postrelative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 40% 40%
Total tenure 0.04981 0.0334 0.02905 0.0303 0.02428 0.03942 0.02231
[0.01673]*** [0.01372]** [0.01688]* [0.01560]* [0.01166]** [0.01692]** [0.01157]*
Total tenure^2 -0.00414 -0.00224 -0.00217 -0.00229 -0.00182 -0.00376 -0.00194
[0.00149]*** [0.00111]** [0.00143] [0.00134]* [0.00092]* [0.00147]** [0.00087]**
Female 0.04914 0.01999 0.02061 0.03946 0.03743
[0.06253] [0.05911] [0.05887] [0.06644] [0.05502]
College degree 0.01258 0.01203 0.01211 0.0096 0.01104
[0.00914] [0.01049] [0.01051] [0.00881] [0.00868]
Outsider -0.00126 -0.00165 -0.00191 0.00312 0.00053
[0.00812] [0.00832] [0.00813] [0.00729] [0.00687]
Previous public office 0.00368 0.00603 0.00584 -0.0015 0.00145
[0.00779] [0.00870] [0.00897] [0.00874] [0.00799]
Age at entry 0.00018 -0.00022 -0.00028 0.00007 -0.00055
[0.00068] [0.00069] [0.00069] [0.00058] [0.00067]
Age at death 0.00017 0.00038 0.00043 0.00026 0.00026
[0.00049] [0.00049] [0.00050] [0.00043] [0.00050]
Military 0.0023 -0.00786 -0.00803 -0.00089 0.00095
[0.00874] [0.00901] [0.00903] [0.00858] [0.00769]
Farmer -0.01674 -0.0209 -0.02073 -0.01979 -0.02404
[0.02569] [0.02452] [0.02481] [0.02684] [0.02229]
Lawyer 0.00624 0.0015 0.00102 0.00868 0.00457
[0.01785] [0.01824] [0.01842] [0.01699] [0.01573]
Business 0.00755 -0.00033 0.00001 0.00802 0.00627







Constant -0.03229 -0.04693 -0.02364 -0.02628 -0.06578 -0.01285 0.00786
[0.02825] [0.03545] [0.04562] [0.04439] [0.03958] [0.03282] [0.03823]
Region  YYYYNYY
Decade YYYYNYY
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYYY





TE(2-1) 0.03739 0.02668 0.02254 0.02343 0.01882 0.02814 0.01649
TE(2-1) p-value 0.0046 0.0173 0.0881 0.0557 0.0484 0.0331 0.086
Observations 3095 3034 3295 3295 3034 3605 3537
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
TE(2-1) is the marginal impact on the chance to have a Postrelative of a total tenure of two terms versus one term 
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%
Table 19: IV-RD Second stage - large windowsWindow size - margin of votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2.5% 5% 10% 25% 40% 55% 70% 85% 98%
Postrelative 0.07995 0.05133 0.04352 0.06279 0.0457 0.0427 0.03628 0.03685 0.03021
[0.06499] [0.04153] [0.02601] [0.02182]*** [0.02035]** [0.01547]*** [0.01535]** [0.01483]** [0.01174]**
Lawyer 0.00245 0.01926 0.02399 0.01315 0.01886 0.01518 0.01439 0.0171 0.0183
[0.02687] [0.03013] [0.01878] [0.01514] [0.01543] [0.01445] [0.01404] [0.01328] [0.01241]
Previous public office -0.13921 -0.16214 -0.15942 -0.0751 -0.06215 -0.03797 -0.02758 -0.03022 -0.02964
[0.08105]* [0.05324]*** [0.06247]** [0.03887]* [0.02976]** [0.02871] [0.02522] [0.02434] [0.02659]
Female 0.00439 0.01287 0.00077 0.0026 0.00599 0.00316 0.00205 0.0014 -0.00005
[0.01732] [0.01422] [0.01084] [0.00745] [0.00647] [0.00520] [0.00466] [0.00446] [0.00396]
Outsider 0.07295 0.10164 0.01957 -0.05671 -0.0451 -0.07267 -0.05589 -0.07351 -0.0638
[0.12040] [0.08714] [0.08995] [0.05570] [0.05083] [0.04571] [0.04135] [0.04027]* [0.03769]*
Age at entry -0.20201 0.60739 0.16625 0.47087 0.21818 0.05975 0.04388 -0.04264 -0.29942
[1.71396] [1.02209] [0.76202] [0.56419] [0.57378] [0.54186] [0.56528] [0.47285] [0.45359]
College graduate -0.2218 -0.07546 -0.11612 -0.01058 0.01645 0.04328 0.04063 0.01915 0.01328
[0.10237]** [0.08851] [0.07317] [0.04784] [0.03805] [0.03221] [0.03113] [0.03181] [0.02785]
Military -0.03016 -0.00517 0.00164 0.03332 0.0474 0.03963 0.03769 0.02438 0.03712
[0.13702] [0.08989] [0.06760] [0.03698] [0.03527] [0.03697] [0.03586] [0.03454] [0.03381]
Farmer -0.00246 -0.01365 -0.00221 -0.00318 0.00053 0.00197 -0.00248 0.00244 0.0059
[0.03015] [0.02571] [0.02089] [0.01581] [0.01481] [0.01182] [0.01163] [0.01089] [0.01075]
Business -0.03016 -0.00517 0.00164 0.03332 0.0474 0.03963 0.03769 0.02438 0.03712
[0.13702] [0.08989] [0.06760] [0.03698] [0.03527] [0.03697] [0.03586] [0.03454] [0.03381]
Region YYYYYYYYY
Decade YYYYYYYYY
Margin of votes quartic YYYYYYYYY
Observations 505 1048 1807 3042 3545 3774 3885 3928 4041
Sample: Individuals without prerelatives who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 20: IV-RD estimates for Longterm on each observable at the region-decade level - rolling windowsDependent Variable: Longterm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Re-Election Instrument 0.37946 0.3351 0.33607 0.3315 0.33372
[.02054]*** [.02198]*** [.023]*** [.02236]*** [.02326]***
Constant 0.54733 0.49868 0.49785 0.50138 0.49971
[.11524]*** [.22981]*** [.22912]** [.23029]** [.22964]**
State/Quarter Interaction Y NNNN
State/Decade Interaction N YYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
YYNYN
Relatives Only Enter 10 
Years or More Later
NNNYY
Observations 7359 7359 6734 7182 6639
F-Stat 179 90 98 88 95
R-Squared 0.127 0.161 0.173 0.16 0.172
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
Table 21: IV First stage for "external shocks" approachDependent Variable: Postrelative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Longterm 0.05863 0.07286 0.03923 0.05779 0.04374
[.02618]** [.03319]** [.02874] [.02734]** [.02393]*
Constant 0.26487 0.19535 0.22058 0.20666 0.21272
[.02128]*** [.02489]*** [.02156]*** [.02051]*** [.01795]***
State/Quarter Interaction Y NNNN
State/Decade Interaction N YYYY
Includes Members with 
Previous Relatives 
YYNYN
Relatives Only Enter 10 
Years or More Later
NNNYY
Observations 7359 7359 6734 7182 6639
R-Squared 0.091 0.121 0.242 0.111 0.112
Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910
Robust standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
Table 22: IV Second stage for "external shocks" approachFigure 1: Trends in Congressmen with Relatives
A: Proportion of Legislators with Relatives B: Proportion of Legislators with Previous Relatives











































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Trends in Congressmen with Previous Relatives
A: Proportion of Legislators with Previous 
Relatives by Region






C: Proportion of Legislators with Previous 
Relatives by PartyFigure 3: Impact of Political Competition on Predicted Proportion of 
Individuals with Previous Relatives in Congress
Note: Political competition is given by an index reflecting the degree to which the state legislature is more or less evenly divided between the two 
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Figure 4: Impact of Total Tenure on the Probability a 
Legislator has a Posterior Relative
Note: Figure 3B gives the predicted values from specification 10 in Table 5. Values of 10 or greater are replaced 
with > 10. This is done given the small number of observations greater than 10.
A: Unconditional Data B: Predicted ValuesFigure 5: The Discontinuous Impact of Victory on Having 
Posterior Relatives
Sample: Sample includes individuals who did not die in office, born before 1910 and with no prerelatives.


















































Margin VoteFigure 6: The Impact of the Vote Margin in First Reelection on 
Long Term and Total Tenure
Sample: Sample includes individuals who did not die in office, born before 1910 and with no prerelatives.
Note: Quartic polynomial interacted with Margin Vote>0 used for interpolation.
A: Long Term B: Total Tenure
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